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Abstract
In the spring of 2004 the Department of the Navy issued requirements for the F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet to integrate tactical imagery for precise machine to machine targeting and real time
mission assessment. The operational intent was to increase the contribution of the F/A-18 to the
kill chain for ground targets.
In response to that requirement the F/A-18 Advanced Weapons Laboratory (AWL) began work
with Boeing on the H2E+ Software Configuration Set (SCS) program which consisted of:
1. Software and hardware changes to aircraft mission computers to support
a. image viewing and editing in the cockpit
b. image transmission and reception over tactical datalinks
c.

capture and save of images from onboard sensors

2. Solid State Recorder (SSR) integration
3. Software changes to Mission Planning stations to support preflight imagery planning and
post flight imagery review
The AWL/Boeing team began flight test with H2E+ and SSR in January 2005. After extensive test
and evaluation, the H2E+ SCS with SSR was found to increase the capability of the F/A-18 to
execute certain steps in the kill chain. However several deficiencies were found that warrant
further development.
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Part 1: Introduction
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1.

Introduction: The following information is provided as information about this document
and its author.
1.1. Objective: This paper will discuss successes and failures of the U. S. Navy acquisition
community to provide a well integrated tactical imagery capability that enhanced the
ability of the F/A-18E/F to perform its missions. Specifically the paper will follow the
integration of the H2E+ SCS, which was a collection of hardware and software upgrades
that were delivered in a group. Objectives of the document are:
•

Provide background information

•

Discuss changes made to enable tactical imagery

•

Discuss results of test and evaluation of tactical imagery

•

Make recommendations for further development to improve tactical imagery

1.2. Scope: All aspects of the H2E+ SCS and SSR underwent extensive testing. For the
purposes of this document, the discussion will be limited to those aspects of H2E+ and
SSR that directly contribute to tactical imagery capability. This document will not cover:
•

H2E+ capability upgrades other than tactical imagery

•

Evaluation of H2E+ without SSR

•

Capabilities of versions of the F/A-18 that could not be upgraded to the H2E+ SCS

1.3. Author: The author was a developmental test pilot with the U.S Navy. He worked as the
H2E+ and SSR project officer from March 2004 until April 2006. As project officer he
was responsible for and executed:
•

Aircrew input for initial design

•

Test planning

•

First flight of H2E+ with SSR

•

Numerous flight test events for imagery exchange

•

Aircrew input for design changes

•

Deficiency documentation and classification

•

Training for fleet operators
See the vita for further discussion of the author’s background.
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2.

Description of the F/A-18 Super Hornet: The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is a multirole carrier-based tactical aircraft capable of air to air and air to ground missions using a wide
variety of onboard weapons, sensors, and communications systems. Figure 2.1 shows the
F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet. The F/A-18 is capable of autonomously employing Global
Positioning System (GPS) guided weapons, laser guided weapons, and free fall weapons.
F/A-18 onboard sensors include multi-mode radar capable of detecting and tracking air and
ground targets, a variety of targeting pods that use infrared and optical sensors to find and
track air and ground targets, and Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS) for rapid
designation of visually significant targets. For a complete description of the F/A-18 refer to the
Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) manual and the
Goldbook, references [a] and [b].
2.1. Basic avionics: The F/A-18E/F incorporates a wide variety of computers, sensors,
weapons, and displays. The avionics system uses two mission computers that control all
other system components via mux busses. Figure 2.2 shows a simplified schematic of
relevant avionics components. Reference [b] contains a complete schematic of all
avionics components. Each component will be discussed at length in the following text.

Figure 2.1; F/A-18F Super Hornet
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Figure 2.2; Simplified avionics diagram of the F/A-18 Super Hornet
2.1.1.Mission Computers (MCs): The F/A-18E/F has two high speed, stored program,
general purpose computers with core memory called MC1 (Mission Computer 1)
and MC2 (Mission Computer 2). They serve four main functions:
o

compute and control the data sent to the cockpit displays,

o

compute missile launch and weapons release commands,

o

provide mode control and option for various avionics systems, and

o

generate BIT initiate signals to and equipment operation status from various
avionics systems (ref [a], page I-2-133)
The mission computer software can be updated to provide new control data to the
displays, new mode control for existing avionics, and mode control for new avionics
systems.

2.1.2.Cockpit displays: The F/A-18E/F cockpit has 4 Multi-Function Displays (MFDs) as
well as a Heads Up Display (HUD) and Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System
(JHMCS). All displays receive information from the MCs, convert that information
into symbology, and present navigation, aircraft attitude, and weapons attack
symbology. Figure 2.3 shows the general configuration of the Super Hornet cockpit.
The four MFDs are configurable displays with pushbuttons that can be used to
select various displays and system operating modes. Left and right displays are
called Digital Display Indicators (LDDI and RDDI). The lower center display is called
the Multi-Purpose Color Display (MPCD). The center display is called the Up Front
Control Display (UFCD). The MPCD and DDIs have active pushbuttons around the
edges that allow aircrew to select new displays or command a mode change. The
UFCD can be configured as a display or can be configured to a keypad display to
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Figure 2.3; Cockpit of the F/A-18 Super Hornet
allow entry of numerical data via touch screen technology. The labels and
unctionality of the display pushbuttons are determined by software in the mission
computer.
2.1.3.Targeting pod: A targeting pod is the primary sensor used to find, identify, and
track ground targets. Targeting pods incorporate both Electrical Optical (EO) and
Infra Red (IR) sensors that can each provide video and targeting data to the aircraft.
EO sensors are also known as TV sensors and rely on visible contrast (black vs
white in the visible spectrum) to produce a visible image. IR sensors are also known
as “heat seekers” and rely on thermal contrast (hot vs cold in the IR spectrum) to
produce a visible image. Figure 2.4 shows a typical targeting pod as installed on an
F/A-18. Targeting pods allow aircrew to perform the following:
2.1.3.1. Sensor to detect ground targets: Aircrew can use other sensors to point
the targeting pod toward suspected targets. The EO and IR sensors then
allow the aircrew to see the target area and locate the precise position of the
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Figure 2.4; Targeting pod installed on the F/A-18 Super Hornet

target. The target area is presented as a visual scene in the cockpit and
aircrew can then command the sensors to slew up/down/left/right to center
the presented video on the target position.
2.1.3.2. Sensor to track ground targets: Once A/G targets are located, targeting
pods incorporate tracking modes that allow EO and IR sensors to stabilize on
points of visual or IR contrast. These track modes reduce aircrew workload
and take advantage of pod sensors to provide best stabilization.
2.1.3.3. Sensor to derive target coordinates: Targeting pods use their current
position, sensor pointing angles, and range-to-target information to derive a
physical location for the object being tracked. These locations are generally
expressed in Latitude/Longitude/Elevation using the World Geodetic System
84 (WGS-84) datum.
2.1.3.4. Laser designator for laser guided weapons: Most targeting pods
incorporate laser target designators that fire laser energy along the pod line of
sight. This laser energy can be used to guide certain weapons that detect and
track laser energy. Laser guidance is generally performed by pointing the pod
EO/IR sensors at the desired target and actuating switches or pushbuttons to
begin laser emission.
2.1.3.5. Super Hornet integration: The Super Hornet is able to carry one targeting
pod on a fuselage station as shown in Figure 2.4. When equipped with a
targeting pod, the MCs generate a targeting pod display (called the FLIR
page) that combines targeting pod video with mission computer generated
symbology. The targeting pod video contains video from the sensor to include
target coordinates, track mode symbology, and advisories that indicate pod
status. The MC generated symbology includes pushbuttons to command
mode changes, pushbuttons to operate the laser, and pushbuttons to change
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pod setup. In later software versions, a North up arrow was generated by the
MCs from targeting pod data to show the orientation of features in the
targeting pod video. A representative FLIR page is shown in Figure 2.5. For a
complete description of targeting pod integration see ref [b] page 5-85.
2.1.4.Tactical datalinks: The F/A-18E/F uses several tactical datalinks to exchange
digital data with other users, to include other aircraft and ground stations. Two
prevalent tactical datalink systems in use with the Super Hornet are Link-16 and
VMF.
2.1.4.1. Link-16: Link 16 (a.k.a. TADIL J (Tactical Data Information Link J), JTIDS
(Joint Tactical Information Distribution System)) is a secure, jam resistant,
digital datalink used to transmit tactical information between datalink
participants. Figure 2.6 shows typical Link-16 users.
2.1.4.1.1.

Users: L-16 is the primary tactical datalink in use in U.S military

tactical aircraft. Link-16 is integrated in U.S Navy surface ships, U.S
Navy aircraft, USMC aircraft, and USAF aircraft. In addition, several
command and control ground stations have Link-16 capability. Basic
requirements to use Link-16 are: integration of a L-16 terminal (an

Figure 2.5; Super Hornet FLIR page
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Figure 2.6; Graphical depiction of Link-16 users (ref [c], page 1-9)
example of which is shown in Figure 2.7) and software and displays
capable of presenting the L-16 messages in a tactically usable format.
2.1.4.1.2.

Description: Link 16 is a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA)

system that uses a repeating pattern of time slots, standardized
message format, and multiple layers of deconfliction. Link-16 is capable
of servicing hundred of users simultaneously due to NPG and net
number options. Individual users are assigned time slots during which
they are able to send or receive the standardized Link-16 messages.
2.1.4.1.2.1. Network: A Link-16 Network data load (network) is a prearranged list of users as well as standardized assignments for
when and where those users will send and receive their Link-16
messages. Users in a Link-16 network are identified by their Track
number (TN), also known as a JTIDS User (JU) number. A TN is a
5 digit alphanumeric identifier that is unique to that user. In order
for two L-16 users to have datalink connectivity, they must be
working on the same network or they will not agree on time slot
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Figure 2.7; Link-16 Low Volume Terminal (LVT)
assignments and messages will not get through. Hundreds of
networks are available for use, but in general each geographical
area (training range or operation area) will have only one network
in use at a time. Changes in timeslot or NPG assignment are made
by requesting a new or modified network. New or modified
networks can be designed and released by the Joint Network
Design facility.
2.1.4.1.2.1.1.

Time slots: The centerpiece of L-16 TDMA architecture

is the definition and assignment of time slots. All L-16 users
must be time synchronized to allow definition of time slots.
Once all users are synchronized, the L-16 network provides
detailed assignment for each time slot.
2.1.4.1.2.1.2.

Network Participation Group (NPG): An NPG is a

group of time slots that are assigned for common uses. For
example, all time slots dedicated to mission assignment
commands are sent out over one NPG and all targeting
messages between fighters go out over a second NPG. The
use of multiple NPGs provides vastly improved flexibility as
multiple messages can be transmitted during the same time
slot, as long as they are sent on different NPGs. Figure 2.8
10

Figure 2.8; Link-16 NPGs (ref [c], page 6-15)
shows a list of NGPs and highlights those in use on the
Super Hornet.
2.1.4.1.2.1.3.

NPG net: Link-16 users can set each NPG to a different

net or channel. Users must be on the same net number to
share information. Selectable net numbers allow groups of
users to communicate without conflicting with other groups
using the same NPG.
2.1.4.1.2.2. Types of messages: Link-16 uses a standard set of messages
that can be transmitted or received. Each type of message is
assigned to an NPG where those types of messages will be
transmitted and received. Figure 2.9 shows a representative list of
Link-16 messages available for use.
2.1.4.1.3.

Super Hornet integration: F/A-18 integration of Link-16 includes a

Multi-Functional Information Distribution System Low Volume Terminal
(MIDS LVT) installed in the avionics bay and aircrew interface through
two displays that can be selected on any of the 4 MFDs. The MIDS
Terminal Control Format (MTCF) display allows aircrew to verify and
modify operation of the terminal, and the Situational Awareness (SA)
page to display the Link-16 information in a graphical format. For a
handful of critical NPGs, the displays in the Super Hornet allow aircrew
11

Figure 2.9; Link-16 messages (ref [c], page 4-7)
to verify net number for their own aircraft and for other Link-16
participants. In addition for these NPGs the aircrew are able to modify
their own net number via entry from the UFCD. Figure 2.10 shows the
MTCF and the UFCD configured to enter Link-16 net numbers. For a
complete description of Link-16 integration see ref [b] page 2-242.The
SA page shows other Link-16 participants as Precise Participant
Location and Identification (PPLI) symbols. Figure 2.11 shows the SA
page with representative Link-16 symbology. In addition the SA page
shows targeting commands and advisory information that have been
received. Aircrew are provided with cursors that can be slewed on the
SA page. When the cursors are slewed over a Link-16 symbol the SA
page changes to a Target under Cursor (TUC) state where information
about the TUC symbol is displayed in the lower corners of the display.
When the TUC is a PPLI the information includes net numbers. PPLIs
can be selected as flight member or track donors on the SA page. This
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Figure 2.10; MTCF and UFCD displays for controlling the Link-16
terminal

Figure 2.11; Super Hornet SA (Situational Awareness) page
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allows aircrew to choose which Link-16 participants contribute to their
symbology.
Incoming Link-16 messages are filtered by the mission computer for
relevance and displayed in priority order. Most outgoing Link-16
messages are sent automatically but select few require pilot action to
send. When certain L-16 messages arrive the aircrew are provided with
a cue in the HUD (TGT CMD, DATA) that alerts them to the presence of
new data on the SA page. The cue flashes for 10 seconds. Figure 2.12
shows the placement of the Link-16 message cue. In general, when
Link-16 messages are sent the receiving terminal sends a link
acknowledgement or “link ack” of message receipt back to the sending
terminal. This link ack is the digital handshake that closes that
transaction and prompts both terminals to move on to the next
message. If a sending terminal does not receive a link ack it will
attempts to resend that message during later transmit time slots.
2.1.4.1.4.

Strengths of Link-16 as a tactical datalink:

2.1.4.1.4.1. Secure via encryption: Link-16 terminals incorporate encryption
methods that make messages accessible only to those with similar

Figure 2.12; Placement of the Link-16 message cue
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encryption devices. All Link-16 messages are secure and no extra
steps are needed to ensure message security.
2.1.4.1.4.2. Wide interoperability: Link-16 is the primary tactical datalink in
use for tactical aircraft. Link-16 is in use in all major aircraft types
in the U.S. Air Force (USAF). Ground based command and control
centers have Link-16 display and the ability to direct aircraft via
Link-16.
2.1.4.1.4.3. Long range to include relay: Link-16 messages are transmitted
to all Link-16 participants within line of sight (LOS), which yields a
long range for tactical aircraft flying at many thousands of feet.
The effective range of Link-16 messages is further enhanced by
relaying, which refers to the feature of many Link-16 terminals of
re-transmitting messages that are not addressed to them. Relay
can drastically extend the effective range.
2.1.4.1.4.4. Wide variety of message types: Link-16 supports a wide
variety of digital targeting messages that can be used creatively
when designing and implementing new tactical capabilities.
2.1.4.1.5.

Weaknesses of Link-16 as a tactical datalink:

2.1.4.1.5.1. Not feasible for ground forces on foot: Link-16 terminals,
while easily incorporated into ships and aircraft, have several
drawbacks for ground forces. From the perspective of a man who
has to put this thing in his backpack, the terminals are large and
bulky and require a large electrical load which leads to further
weight in batteries. True integration with ground forces, which
would require a Link-16 terminal and power supply system that is
small and light enough for carriage by foot, is not yet available.
2.1.4.1.5.2. Not in every platform: While Link-16 is widely used among
tactical aircraft, not all tactical aircraft have operational Link-16
terminals. The USN is still scrambling to retrofit older Hornets with
Link-16 and the USMC has no plans to ever integrate Link-16 on
its older attack aircraft. While the majority of USAF aircraft have
Link-16 installed, some platforms are still integrating Link-16
capability.
2.1.4.2. Variable Message Format (VMF)
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2.1.4.2.1.

Description: VMF is a message standard that defines a

standardized set of messages. VMF can be implemented in many
different forms for transmission method, encryption, and network design.
2.1.4.2.2.

Users: VMF is incorporated into a handful of tactical aircraft to

include F/A-18, AV-8B, F-16, and EA-6B. VMF ground stations designed
to be carried by ground troops have been developed and are
undergoing operational test.
2.1.4.2.3.

Messages: The VMF standard defines a standardized series of

messages. Each message includes sender, intended recipient,
message type, data assurance, and message content. Figure 2.13
shows VMF messages in use in the F/A-18.
2.1.4.2.4.

F/A-18 integration: The F/A-18 implementation of the VMF

message set is known as Digital Communication Suite (DCS). It allows
mission planning of a DCS network, inflight modification of DCS
network, transmission and reception of VMF messages through the
ARC-210 radio, and interpretation of the VMF messages into cockpit
symbology. Super Hornet integration of VMF was designed for
execution of the Close Air Support (CAS) mission, to be discussed later.
Therefore all VMF messages are CAS related and are manually sent
and received via the CAS page. Mission computer logic converts CAS
mission data (a shown in the cockpit) into standardized VMF messages
that can be sent to other VMF users via the DCS radios. VMF messages
are only sent when manually commanded. Figure 2.14 shows the Super
Hornet CAS page with controls for sending VMF messages. For a
complete description of VMF integration see ref [b] page 2-80.

Figure 2.13; VMF messages (ref [d], page B-2)
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Figure 2.14; Super Hornet CAS page
2.1.4.2.4.1. Network: A DCS network consists of a list of users and their
node information (analogous to email address). All users in a
network must agree on transmission method, encryption method,
and network setup (user names and node information) in order to
pass VMF messages. The DCS network data is editable in the
cockpit on the VMF NETS page. Figure 2.15 shows the Super
Hornet VMF Nets page.
2.1.4.2.4.2. Nodes: DCS uses a node based network which uses direct
communication between participants. DCS users must establish
themselves as a node and ensure that all other users know their
node information. A DCS network can handle up to 8 nodes but
may start to miss messages if more than 4 nodes are in a network.
DCS uses TDMA architecture to deconflict the 8 nodes.
2.1.4.2.4.3. Message reception: When the mission computer recognizes
that a VMF message has been received and is ready to view, a
cue (CAS or FTXT or OSR) is flashed in the HUD to alert the
aircrew to the presence of a newly received VMF message. The
cue flashes until the message is requested on the CAS page.
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Figure 2.15; Super Hornet VMF NETS page
Figure 2.16 shows the placement of the VMF message cue. An
aircraft sending VMF messages will request a digital
acknowledgement of message receipt from the receiver aircraft
known as a link acknowledgement or “link ack”. This link ack is the
cue to both aircraft that the message is complete and both aircraft
begin working on the next message. If a sender aircraft receives
no link ack it will attempt to resend the message.
2.1.4.2.5.

Strengths of VMF as a tactical datalink:

2.1.4.2.5.1. Compatibility with ground troops: VMF ground stations are
under test that would allow ground troops to carry VMF messaging
capability with them. The VMF system allows direct contact
between air power and ground troops.
2.1.4.2.5.2. Small list of customers: Due to the relatively low numbers of
tactical aircraft using VMF, the F/A-18 program has been able to
work closely with the VMF ground station contractors to shape
VMF ground station requirements and VMF message standards.
The small VMF world is highly adaptable and can be influenced by
the Hornet community.
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Figure 2.16; Placement of the VMF message cue
2.1.4.2.6.

Limitations of VMF as a tactical datalink:

2.1.4.2.6.1. Use of aircraft radios to transmit/receive: As integrated into
the Super Hornet, all VMF messages are transmitted and received
via the ARC-210 radio. This requires that one radio be used
primarily for VMF messages and very sparingly for voice. The
ARC-210 radio provides an audible “click” when VMF messages
traffic is moving to provide aircrew with clear indication of VMF
operation. Use of VMF requires aircrew to time-share one of the
two aircraft radios during message exchange.
2.1.4.2.6.2. ARC-210 encryption: VMF messages are not inherently
encrypted but contain critical information about target location,
friendly locations, and friendly operations. The ARC-210 radio can
be commanded to perform encryption of outgoing VMF messages
and decryption of incoming VMF messages. However the
encryption/decryption process significantly slows down VMF
message transmission times.
2.1.4.2.6.3. Limited range: The poor integration of VMF signals in the F/A18 (poor antenna properties for this waveform) limits the usable
range of this system. VMF users must be relatively close to ensure
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reliable reception of each other’s messages. The limited range of
the VMF system requires that CAS aircraft hold closer than
tactically desired to the ground controller during VMF message
exchange.
2.1.4.2.6.4. Very limited interoperability: While VMF is in use on several
tactical aircraft, the DCS integration of the VMF message (as
implemented in the Super Hornet) is not compatible with any other
aircraft VMF system. VMF interoperability is very limited with
platforms outside the Hornet world. While several ground stations
are in work to provide operation VMF message exchange
capability, there are no ground systems in operational use today
using this capability. VMF is only usable between Hornets.
2.1.5.Cockpit Video Recording System (CVRS): The cockpit video record system in
the F/A18E/F consists of two 8mm tape recorders that are driven by a record
control panel in the cockpits. Aircrew can turn the record system on/off and select
which of the displays should be routed to the 2 recorders through the record panel.
2.1.5.1. Record media: The removable media to which cockpit video is recorded
consists of two 8mm tapes with 90-minute record capacity, the ability to play
back in an 8mm VCR, and no self-destruct capability.
2.1.5.2. Record hardware: The record hardware consists of two TEAC 8 mm tape
record boxes that fit in an avionics bay behind the ejection seats. The TEAC
recorders are controlled by switches on the record control panel.
2.1.5.3. Record control panel: The record control panel consists of three toggle
switches with three positions for each switch. The first toggle switch controls
overall record status and is labeled OFF-MAN-AUTO. The other two toggle
switches allow aircrew to choose which display should be recorded. Figure
2.17 shows a typical record control panel. Recording is commanded by
selecting the OFF-MAN-AUTO switch to the MAN or AUTO positions.
2.1.5.4. Record indications: Record status is indicated by the RCDR ON light on the
warning and caution panel just to the right of the UFCD. The RCDR light
illuminates when power is applied to the CVRS system. The RCDR ON light
only indicates that power is applied to the record system and is not an actual
indication that recording is in progress. The RCDR ON light will be illuminated
when the record switch is on regardless of tape run to the end, CVRS
recorder problem, or no tape installed.
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Figure 2.17; Record control panel
2.1.5.5. Mission limitations: The cockpit video record system should allow aircrew
to quickly determine the health and record status of the CVRS system,
however the existing CVRS system provides no indication of record time
remaining, end of tape reached, no confirmation that recording is actually
underway, and provides very little information about its health and record
status.
2.1.6.JMPS/Advanced Memory Unit (AMU) loader: The JMPS/AMU loader system
allows aircrew to preplan mission data at a laptop computer then use removable
media to move the preplanned mission data to the aircraft. JMPS is a computerbased mission planning workstation that allows aircrew to plan waypoints, aircraft
mode settings, weapons data, and MIDS information. The AMU card is a removable
PCMCIA card to which JMPS can write. The AMU loader is a PCMCIA receptacle in
the aircraft that moves JMPS files to the appropriate aircraft avionics system (MCs,
MIDS terminal). Prior to start the aircrew place the AMU into the aircraft AMU
loader and upon power application the AMU data is downloaded to the appropriate
avionics system via the mux bus. Upon completion of the mission the AMU contains
weapons release data, mission completion data, and maintenance data that assist
aircrew with mission debriefing and maintenance status of the aircraft. Figure 2.18
shows the JMPS mission planning system.
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Laptop based hardware

Windows based software

Figure 2.18; JMPS (Joint Mission Planning System)
2.1.7.Built in Test (BIT) Status: The configurable MFDs in the F/A-18 provide a BIT
page that lists status of onboard equipment. Common BIT status indications are
NOT RDY, IN TEST, GO, DEGD, and NO GO. These BIT indications provide
information about the health and operational readiness of the affected system.
When a system changes BIT indications (for example from GO to DEGD) a BIT
advisory is set to alert aircrew that some onboard system has changed BIT status.
The BIT advisory cues the aircrew to select the BIT page for viewing of the BIT
status of relevant systems, at which time the BIT advisory is cleared and reset.
2.1.8.Control of classified material: Many aspects of F/A-18 missions have
classification considerations to include point of origin, route of flight, targets against
which weapons are employed, parameters at which weapons are employed, and
tactics that aircrew use to employ the weapon system. The classification of many
segments of the mission results in the need to closely control storage of classified
data to non-volatile storage. When any classified data is stored to any of the usual
storage areas, the mission computers flag that storage area as classified and
provide cockpit cues that onboard systems are classified. In addition the mission
computers provide the ability to erase onboard classified material inflight or after
landing, allowing aircrew to clear any unwanted classified material. This ability to
declassify the aircraft is particularly important if performing an emergency divert to a
country that is not a very close ally (such as the EP-3 that was forced to land on a
Chinese island).
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2.1.8.1. CDATA: When classified material is detected in onboard storage, a CDATA
advisory is set on the DDIs and Maintenance Status Panel (MSP) codes are
set to indicate which aircraft components are classified. The CDATA advisory
provides aircrew with a top-level cue that classified data is present in the
aircraft.
2.1.8.2. Classified erase: When classified data has been detected in onboard
memory, the aircraft presents ERASE pushbuttons that provide a means for
aircrew to erase the classified files. Upon completion of the erase the aircraft
systems are unclassified.
2.2. Single/dual seat: The F/A-18E/F is built in both single seat and dual seat
configurations. Integration of the aft seat adds 4 more aft seat MFDs as well as an aft
seat JHMCS. Single seat aircraft are used almost exclusively as carrier based
operational strike aircraft. Two seat Hornets are used both as carrier based operational
strike aircraft and as trainer aircraft. Operational dual seat aircraft incorporate a
Weapons Systems Officer (WSO) in the aft seat who is dedicated to the use of onboard
sensors to complete the air to air and air to ground missions. Incorporation of two
aircrew eases cockpit workloads associated with complex air to air and air to ground
missions, but the prevalence of single seat aircraft requires that aircraft designs focus on
well integrated systems that provide the aircrew with minimal additional workload during
critical phases of flight.
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3. Air to ground missions of the Super Hornet: The Super Hornet executes a wide
variety of air to ground missions.
3.1. Kill chain: All air to ground (A/G) missions of the F/A-18 are variations on the same
sequence of events known as the kill chain. The kill chain describes the sequence of
events used to prosecute ground targets. The kill chain has six steps:
o

Find: Determine the presence of the target and derive very rough target location.

o

Fix: Determine the precise location of the target.

o

Target: Hand the target off to local firepower with location and orders to engage

o

Track: Update target position with high quality location suitable for weapons
engagement

o

Engage: Apply firepower to the target (the killing part of the kill chain)

o

Assess: Determine if the firepower had the desired effect and call for follow on attack
if necessary.

As a tactical aircraft with relatively short range sensors, the F/A-18 generally relies on
external command and control assets to perform the first few steps of the kill chain.
However, some missions allow the Super Hornet greater mission flexibility to perform
earlier parts of the kill chain.
3.2. Strike mission: We will define a “strike” mission as a mission where aircrew receive
their assigned target prior to their flight briefing and takeoff. The Find, Fix, Target, and
Track links of the chain are completed by external assets. Due to the highly dynamic
nature of modern battlefields, the strike mission is becoming less prominent than during
previous conflicts. Key properties of a Strike mission:
o

The kill chain is complete up to Track with time to provide target information and
imagery prior to the flight briefing.

o

The aircrew are able to study maps and imagery of the target area during their flight
briefing.

o

Aircrew have high quality target coordinates for their weapons and sensors loaded in
their systems at takeoff.

Aircrew can concentrate on the Engage and Assess portions of a strike mission.
3.3. Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) mission: We will define a “time sensitive strike” as a
mission where the aircrew receive their tasking after their flight briefing. The Find, Fix,
Target, and Track links are completed by external assets but cannot be communicated
to the aircrew prior to the flight briefing. Key points of a time sensitive strike:
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o

Aircrew do not have precise target coordinates or imagery during their flight briefing
and are unable to familiarize themselves with the target during the briefing.

o

The handoff of targeting data is performed in flight from a command and control
platform, either airborne or ground based command and control center.

o

Handoff of target data would most likely include target coordinates and target
description

Aircrew listen to a verbal description of the target area over the radio and must use the
verbal description to find the target upon arrival. If they are able to find the target they
complete the Engage and Assess portions.
3.4. Close Air Support (CAS) mission: We will define a CAS mission as a mission where
aircrew receive their tasking in-flight from a ground controller who is in direct contact with
enemy ground forces. The ground forces provide most steps of the kill chain and then
hand off the target to the CAS aircraft via a standardized CAS briefing that includes
target coordinates and verbal description. Key components of a CAS mission:
o

Aircrew do not have precise target coordinates or imagery during their flight briefing
and are unable to familiarize themselves with the target during the briefing.

o

The handoff of targeting data is performed in flight via voice communications with
ground troops in close contact with enemy forces

o

Target handoff would include target coordinates, description, run in heading, and
voice “talk-on”.

Voice talk-on consists of the ground controllers using visually significant ground features
to guide the aircrew eyes and targeting pods to the desired target. The talk-on might
consist of large visual features (river, highways, towns) and would then get more specific
with comments such as “on the west bank of the northern-most bridge” or “one block
southeast of the road intersection”. The talk-on is necessary due to the close proximity of
friendly and hostile forces. In order to employ weapons in a CAS scenario the ground
controller and aircrew must be absolutely certain of the target in order to prevent aircraft
dropping weapons on friendly troops (friendly fire).
One major challenge of the visual talk on from a ground controller is the difference in
perspective from the ground troops point of view and the CAS aircraft point of view.
Those features which are visually significant to the ground troops (hiding behind building
in the target area) may be drastically different from those that are visually significant to
the aircrew (flying above the target area). Finding a common visual reference point is the
cornerstone of visual talk on.
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3.5. Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC(A)) Mission: We will define a FAC(A) mission
as an airborne controller for aircraft executing CAS. A FAC(A) will have limited ordnance
but will be able to assign CAS aircraft against targets that the FAC(A) can find but
cannot engage. The FAC(A) aircraft must perform the first four steps of the kill chain
autonomously and then provide target handoff to the CAS aircraft as described in 2.4.
Key components of the FAC(A) mission:
o

FAC(A) aircrew do not have precise target coordinates or imagery during their flight
briefing and are unable to familiarize themselves with the target during the briefing.

o

FAC(A) aircrew must find and maintain a list of multiple targets for distribution to CAS
aircraft

o

The handoff of targeting data is performed in flight via voice communications
between aircraft

o

Target handoff would include target coordinates, description, run in heading, and
voice “talk-on”.

Voice talk on would be the same as listed for CAS but the FAC(A) is now performing the
talk on. The FAC(A) has the advantage of looking at the target area from a perspective
similar to that of the CAS aircraft so those feature that are visually significant to the
FAC(A) should also be visually significant to the CAS aircraft.
3.6. Weapons: The F/A-18E/F can use several general types of weapons to perform the
“Engage” step of the kill chain.
3.6.1.General Purpose (GP) bombs: GP weapons or “dumb bombs” are unguided
weapons that are visually aimed at the target prior to release. No midcourse
guidance is available and the accuracy of the weapon is very dependent upon the
release parameters. Accurate delivery of GP weapons from aircraft requires visual
or targeting pod contact with the target must be maintained until weapon release.
Super Hornets delivery GP weapons autonomously using an onboard visual or
targeting pod designation.
3.6.2.Laser guided weapons: Laser guided weapons are guided weapons that are
guided to their target by laser energy. Laser energy can be provided by an onboard
targeting pod, targeting pods on other airborne assets, or by a ground based laser
marker. Laser guided weapons can be gravity or forward firing (Laser Guided Bomb
(LGB) or laser guided missile). Accurate delivery of laser-guided weapons from
aircraft requires that the weapon is released with general knowledge of target
location and that laser energy is provided on the target throughout weapon time of
fall (until weapon impact). Super Hornets can delivery laser guided weapons
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autonomously (target location and laser energy from onboard targeting pod) or
cooperatively (target location from onboard systems, laser energy provided by
offboard targeting pod).
3.6.3.GPS guided weapons: GPS guided weapons are munitions that use a GPS signal
to navigate to pre-determined target coordinates. Examples are the Guided Bomb
Unit (GBU)-31/32/38 JDAM family and the Air to Ground Missile (AGM)-154 JSOW
family. Target coordinates can be loaded during mission planning or can be sent to
the aircraft in-flight via tactical datalink. Accurate delivery of GPS weapons requires
very precise target coordinates. Super Hornets can deliver JDAM using preplanned
target coordinates, can manually enter new target coordinates in flight, or can
employ JDAM against targets that are designated by the targeting pod.
3.7. Bomb Hit Analysis (BHA): For all weapon impacts, a critical part of weapon delivery is
the collection of cockpit video that includes all aspects of the weapon event. All BHA
information will be roughly assessed inflight and reviewed in detail during the post
mission debriefing.
3.7.1.Weapons release: At weapon release the aircrew must record their release
parameters, which will be compared against planned parameters to ensure safe
and effective technique was used. Additionally aircrew must record the target
information at release to include target coordinates, source of the coordinates, and
spatial relationship of the aircraft to the target.
3.7.2.Weapon impact: Aircraft equipped with a targeting pod will point the targeting pod
at the target throughout the time of fall of the weapon. At weapon impact the
aircrew assess the actual point of impact and weapon fuzing. Aircrew must ensure
that the actual point of impact is recorded for comparison against the intended point
of impact. Small differences in actual vs. intended impact can alter the effect of the
weapon. The aircrew can easily assess weapon fuzing by watching for an initial
explosion.
3.7.3.Post impact: Some weapon impacts will exhibit secondary explosions that will
provide information about the type of target and provide valuable intelligence.
Aircrew will make a rough assessment of the secondary effect of the explosion.
Additionally some targets will exhibit obvious damage that can be reported after
review is complete.
3.8. Debriefing: F/A-18 aircrew conduct extensive debriefings following training flights to
evaluate the aircraft and aircrew performance and derive lessons learned and corrective
actions for future flights. For best efficiency, the post flight debriefing must contain
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appropriate data to piece together the major events of the mission and determine areas
where execution needs to improve.
3.8.1.Tactical decisions: Aircrew review the overall flow of the flight as well as targeting
command and targeting decisions to ensure that intended command on control plan
was executed.
3.8.2.BHA: Aircrew will review their weapons release parameters as well as review the
target location to ensure proper technique was used. In addition aircrew will review
cockpit video and targeting pod video to watch for other items of interest from the
aircraft side (mode selected, pod indications) or from the target side (other targets
in the area, overall effect of the weapon on the desired target)
3.8.3.Lessons learned: Aircrew derive lessons learned from the command and control
plan, the tactical decisions made in flight, and the weapons release parameters.
The accuracy and utility of these lessons learned depends on the quality and
accuracy of the debriefing tools available, of which the most important is cockpit
video.
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Part 3: Changes to enable tactical imagery
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4.

Operational intent and requirements: The operational intent and requirements
provide the background for design of system changes.
4.1. Operational intent: The operational intent of integration of tactical imagery was to
provide digital machine-to-machine targeting (DMMT) and real time mission assessment
(RTMA).
4.1.1.

DMMT: The intent of DMMT was the use of datalink instead of voice to exchange
digital targeting data. DMMT includes digital target coordinates (a separate
discussion) and a digital image of the target. This digital information is particularly
useful when engaging targets in an unfamiliar target area. Key concepts of DMMT
are:

o

Digital datalinks are encrypted and provide better security

o

Digital datalinks provide highly precise and dependable exchange of data

o

A picture is worth a thousand words

DMMT targeting has limited use for the Strike mission but has great value for the TST
mission, the CAS mission, and the FAC(A) mission.
4.1.1.1. TST Mission: With tactical imagery capability the command and control
platform can send an image of the new target area along with the new target
coordinates. While enroute to the new target area aircrew can familiarize
themselves with features of the target area and their relationship to the newly
assigned target. Imagery can move a time sensitive strike very close to a
strike mission, where aircrew can familiarize themselves with imagery of the
target prior to arrival at the target. While in the target area the aircrew can
focus on the “Engage” portion of the kill chain.
4.1.1.2. CAS mission: While many elements of the CAS mission remain unchanged,
with DMMT capability between ground troops and aircraft the handoff of
targets can become much simpler. Digital targeting coordinates put the
aircrew eyes and targeting pods in the targeting area and the image shows
the relationship of the target to other features in the target area. The key part
of the visual talk-on is establishing a common visual reference point from
which all targeting corrections will take place. Tactical imagery is capable of
passing a target area with visually significant features that can then be used
as common reference points, after which the rest of the visual talk on should
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be quick and simple. Imagery can provide quicker and easier visual talk-ons
by providing both ground troops and aircrew with confidence in common
visual reference points.
4.1.1.3. FAC(A) mission: Tactical imagery is a very powerful tool for a FAC(A),
whose most important job is to put the eyes and targeting pods of other
aircraft on known ground targets. Again digital target coordinates are used to
put the CAS aircraft eyes and targeting pod into the targeting area and
common visual references, established by the target area image, provide the
foundation for quick and easy talk on. Since the FAC(A) is taking imagery
from a targeting pod presumed to be similar to those on other aircraft, the
imagery quality and content should be very similar (same hot/cold/black/white
spots)
4.1.1.4. Non-Traditional Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (NTISR): The
ability to capture onboard targeting pod images and send them to ground
stations allows a new NTISR mission to be executed. Aircraft can be sent to
take imagery of suspected hostile areas and the imagery can be sent to
ground stations or intelligence centers for imagery evaluation. Furthermore,
some ground stations advertise the ability to perform computer correlation of
tactical imagery with existing imagery databases to use a tactical image to
derive high quality targeting coordinates. The NTISR role requires that certain
image “properties” data be sent with the image in order to enable correlation
4.1.1.5. DMMT scenario: One example of intended use for imagery in DMMT is a
CAS scenario with Super Hornets working as FAC(A) and CAS aircraft. The
FAC(A) aircraft may be working with a ground FAC or independently to locate
enemy forces on the ground. After locating the ground target the FAC(A)
would build a CAS mission and prepare to talk the CAS aircraft onto the
intended target. With these system changes the FAC(A) would be able to
point the targeting pod at the target and take a still image of the target area
and surrounding features. During CAS mission assignment the FAC(A) would
then be able to send this image along to the CAS aircraft. The CAS aircraft
would be able to view the image and determine the general layout of the
target area as well as position of the intended target within the target area.
During the target acquisition phase of the CAS mission the CAS aircraft would
be able to compare the image against the real time video from onboard target
pod, allowing direct correlation of the two scenes and more rapid acquisition
of the intended target.
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4.1.2.

RTMA: RTMA refers to the tailoring of onboard systems to perform the Assess
step of the kill chain in flight, in particular to evaluate mission effectiveness and
determine if further attacks against that target are required. Execution of the assess
portion include evaluation of weapon impact and fuzing as well as preliminary
evaluation of the effects of the weapon on the intended target.

4.1.2.1. Challenges to RTMA: Historically the Super Hornet systems have not been
well suited for in cockpit mission assessment. The only RTMA available was
watching the displays live to observe as many parameters as possible.
However a target area is very busy places for strike aircraft as the tasks of
target acquisition, weapons system setup, threat avoidance, aircraft
placement for weapons release, communications with the friendly troops, and
visual contact with other aircraft must all be performed. That left little time for
gleaning information from displays in the short period of time when the
specific events were happening. Aircrew, particularly single seat aircrew, were
not in a good position to stare at the targeting pod video real time to evaluate
the finer points of the delivery or the impact. With the ability to capture still
images of bomb impacts the aircrew would be able to concentrate on
execution in the target area and use the review the saved images after
egressing the target area when workload would be lower.
4.1.2.2. FAC(A) mission: While performing a FAC(A) mission an imagery capable
aircraft could take images of the CAS aircraft weapon impacts, thereby assist
other aircraft with their RTMA and completing that step of the kill chain for
them.
4.1.2.3. RTMA scenario: One example of intended use of the RTMA capability
involves a single aircraft performing a strike mission against a ground target.
The strike aircraft would release weapons against the target and continue to
point the targeting pod at the target area to get BHA video of the weapons
impact. After egressing the target area and when clear of threats the strike
aircraft would report mission results to the command and control agency that
assigned the mission. With the integration of tactical imagery a Super Hornet
would be able to capture images before and after weapon impact. After
egressing the target area the Super Hornet aircrew would be able to view the
before and after images and make an initial assessment of mission success.
Additionally the Super Hornet would be able to send the “before and after”
images to the command and control agency for analysis by intelligence
personnel. This provides real-time feedback to the aircrew about mission
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success, provides the command and control center with near-real-time
feedback about mission success, and allows the command and control center
to rapidly update their target list and most efficiently task and re-task airborne
strike assets.
4.2. System requirements to enable tactical imagery: The following general requirements
were defined in order to enable tactical imagery:
4.2.1.

Load images during preflight planning: Allow aircrew to use JMPS during preflight mission planning to pick images to be loaded, annotate those images if
desired, and load them to a memory module that moved between JMPS and the
aircraft. Specific elements of the requirement included the ability to:

o

Load 20 images during mission planning

o

Determine which available images contain a desired target area

o

Plan images taken from map database resident on JMPS

o

Plan up to 5 annotations on the image

4.2.2.

Receive image (L-16/VMF): Allow aircrew to receive inflight images from
offboard sources via Link-16 and VMF datalink. Specific elements of the
requirement included the ability to:

o

Set up the systems to enable imagery

o

Determine from cockpit cues that an image had arrived

o

Accept or reject the image as desired

o

Determine the image source (who sent the image)

4.2.3.

Capture onboard images: Allow aircrew to capture still images of targeting pod
video inflight and save the image within the aircraft for later viewing. Specific
requirements included the ability to:

o

Enable or disable the capture system

o

Clearly tell when capture was available

o

Rapidly “point and shoot” capture single images with the targeting pod

o

Capture multiple images from the targeting pod around the time of weapon
impact

o

Calculate mensuration Data (META) for each image to include latitude/ longitude/
elevation of the center and four corners of the image, and sensor pointing
information (this would enable image correlation for capable ground stations)
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4.2.4.

Save/recall multiple images: Allow the aircrew to save multiple images, both
from onboard capture and from offboard imagery, which can be retrieved and
viewed in flight. Specific requirements included ability to:

o

Store 100 images

o

Delete unwanted images

o

Find and recall particular images from out of the list

o

Determine the source of all images in the list

4.2.5.

Display images inflight: Allow the aircrew to view images inflight. Specific
requirements included the ability to:

o

Quickly switch between images

o

View the images with multiple compression types

o

View the image using multiple compression ratios.

4.2.6.

Annotate image: Allow the aircrew to mark points of interest in an image.
Specific requirements included the ability to:

o

Add 5 annotations to each image inflight

o

Select the position and size of the annotations on the image.

4.2.7.

Send image (L-16/VMF): Allow aircrew to send images to other datalink
participants via Link-16 and VMF. Specific requirements included the ability to:

o

Choose single recipient or group of recipients

o

Monitor transmission progress

4.2.8.

Review images during postflight review: Allow aircrew to use JMPS after the
flight to review and save images that were captured or received during flight.
Specific requirements included the ability to:

o

Download from a memory unit

o

View images to include in-flight annotations
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5.

System changes to enable tactical imagery: The changes to incorporate tactical
imagery included new hardware, software changes, and datalink changes.
5.1. General design philosophy: The general design plan was to integrate a solid state
recorder (SSR) that would replace the existing 8mm recorders and provide storage of:
o

Recorded cockpit video

o

Recorded targeting pod video

o

Still images

The two buzzwords of SSR integration were COTS and form-fit-function. The project
management made the assumption that a COTS (commercial off the shelf) product would
function exactly as advertised. The project management also wanted to make SSR look
and function as closely to 8mm tapes as possible to minimize integration costs, therefore
insisted on form-fit-function mindset when possible.
In order to exchange imagery between aircraft and between aircraft and ground stations,
software changes were designed to allow imagery to be moved over two parallel datalink
systems, Link-16 and VMF. This would allow best flexibility for image exchange with the
maximum number of platforms. Additionally datalink network and message standards
changes were required to use Link-16 and VMF to move imagery. Most of the aircraft
architecture, including cockpit displays and the mux bus that connected avionics
components, was already capable of displaying and transferring imagery.
Changes were required in several areas (VMF, Link-16, SSR, mission computer
software) in order to provide tactical imagery capability. In order to consolidate these
changes and ensure proper system integration, these changes were combined into one
set of changes and named the H2E+ SCS. The SCS philosophy (consolidation of many
small updates into one larger update) was intended to provide the best product to the
operational users by ensuring minimum impact and maximum increase in operational
capability. Additionally the SCS philosophy provided best evaluation of interaction
between the modified subsystems.
5.1.1.

Video storage: Cockpit video would be recorded to the SSR and stored on a

removable memory module (RMM). The RMM could be used to transport video between
aircraft and JMPS machine for video playback.
5.1.2.

Image storage: Received or captured images would be stored as image files on
the RMM. Maintaining the image files on the RMM would allow aircrew to move
images between JMPS and the aircraft to allow preflight planning and post flight
image review.

35

5.1.3.

Image capture: Image capture would be performed by taking still video frames
from the recorded targeting pod video. The recorded targeting pod video would be
time stamped and the aircrew would be given a pushbutton that would allow them
to command an image capture. The time of the image capture command would be
noted by the mission computer and that time would be used to search the targeting
pod video in the SSR for the video frame that corresponded to the capture
command time. That video frame would be extracted from the video, turned into an
image file, and saved to the RMM.

5.1.4.

Imagery over datalinks: Image files were too big to be moved as a whole over
either tactical datalink. Therefore, prior to sending the images would be
compressed and then divided into small image “packets” that would be small
enough to fit into the Link-16 and VMF time slots. Image compression would be
available via two different compression methods, EagleEye and JPEG. This would
allow maximum flexibility for working with many different platforms. The receiver
could then receive a series of image packets, re-assemble the image packets into
an image, and view the image on cockpit displays. For VMF a new image message
was required that would allow a multiple image packets to be sent between
participants. For Link-16 the J16.0 imagery message and the Imagery NPG (NPG
11) already existed but were not in use in the F/A-18.

5.2. System changes: A simplified impression of the Super Hornet avionics system after
changes were made to enable tactical imagery is shown graphically in Figure 5.1.
Important changes to note are:
o

Replacement of the CVRS with a SSR

o

Flow of BIT/status information from SSR to mux bus (not present with CVRS)

o

Flow of video record to the SSR

o

Flow of targeting pod video between the targeting pod and the SSR

o

Flow of imagery between MCs, displays, datalinks, and SSR

5.2.1.

Solid State Recorder (SSR): The F/A-18 AWL was directed to integrate the
TEAC Aerospace MDR-80 SSR with 25 Gigabyte RMMs. The MDR-80 was
designed to replace the TEAC 8mm recorders that are the recording platform for
the existing CVRS system. The MDR-80 size and shape are nearly identical to the
profile of the 8mm recorders. Figure 5.2 shows the SSR and RMM chosen for
Super Hornet integration. The MDR-80 included 4 video connections, a power
connection, and a control connection designed to allow mission computer control of
the SSR via the mux bus.
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Figure 5.1; Simplified avionics schematic showing changes to support imagery

Figure 5.2; TEAC Aerospace MDR-80 SSR and 25G RMM
5.2.1.1. CVRS replacement: The MDR-80 was intended to be a form/fit/function
replacement for the dual TEAC 8mm recorders. The existing CVRS interface
was used to turn on recording and select the two displays to be recorded. In
order to maintain the existing interface, only two of the four video connections
could be used. The very poor but pre-existing video record indication (RCDR
ON light) was also used to show that recording had been commanded. Thus
the requirement to make the SSR a form/fit/function replacement was
followed to a fault.
5.2.1.2. Recording targeting pod video: To enable image capture from the
targeting pod, the SSR was required to record targeting pod video from which
still video frames could be extracted. The third video connection was used to
input targeting pod video. Along with each frame of video the SSR recorded
the sensor pointing angles and latitude/longitude of the center and four
corners of the image. The requirement was to record “raw” targeting pod
video, which was straight from the targeting pod and contained no mission
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computer symbology. This was intended to minimize the clutter for viewing
the image and to assist in image correlation on ground stations.
5.2.1.3. Video connections: Two of the SSR’s four video connections were used as
inputs for cockpit video as commanded by the CVRS control panel. The third
was used to record targeting pod video to enable image capture. The fourth
video connection was left dormant as a growth feature for future development.
Figure 5.3 graphically shows SSR connections with the aircraft, including the
unused Video out connection.
5.2.1.4. RMM properties: The TEAC RMM was a bundle of PCMCIA cards that had
been hardened for airborne use. It was essentially a ruggedized external hard
drive that advertised a 25 Gigabyte capacity. It could be connected via firewire to a computer where it inventoried as removable media. It could be
connected to a JMPS machine to allow preflight planning of images, postflight
review of images, and postflight video review. The RMM internal file structure
was set up with “video” directories to which video was recorded, an “image”
directory to which images were saved, and a “log” directory where command/
control and record status data was archived.
5.2.2.

VMF message standards: No imagery message was defined in the VMF
message standards (see Figure 2.13). A new message was required to handle the
large volume of data in an imagery message. Boeing applied to the Joint Services
VMF subgroup and received approval for a new K04.17 imagery message.

5.2.3.

Link-16 network: In reviewing current Link-16 network architecture, a design
decision was required to decide which NPG Hornets should use to exchange

X

Figure 5.3; Physical connections of SSR to aircraft
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imagery. The prime candidates were NPG 19, which was already in use in
Hornets and easy to implement, or adding the use of NPG 11, which is reserved
for imagery but had not previously been used by Hornets. Analysis of the two
designs showed that the use of NPG 11 would incur more short-term costs but
promised greater flexibility and growth potential.
5.2.3.1. NPG 11: Network changes were required to give F/A-18s the ability to use
NPG 11. This included changing time slot assignments so that F/A-18s now
had both transmit and receive time slots on NPG 11.
5.2.3.2. Network design: The F/A-18 AWL applied to NCTSI for two stages of
network modifications. The first was the building of a new image capable test
network that could be used to confirm the correct operation of the imagery
systems. The second stage was modification of all operational networks to
provide NPG 11 transmit and receive time slots for F/A-18s. The first stage
was completed prior to the arrival of the first build of H2E+ and the test
network was used throughout the test program, with a few notable exceptions.
The second stage of network modification was ongoing at the time of writing
and had not yet been applied to all networks. At the time of writing some
major operating and training areas had imagery capable networks but several
stragglers were still getting caught up.
5.2.4.

JMPS: JMPS changes were required to support several new imagery functions
to include preflight planning and postflight review of the RMM, preflight selection of
imagery capable network, preflight selection of imagery recipients, and post flight
video review.

5.2.4.1. Imagery preflight: A new JMPS interface was added to allowed preflight
selection, annotation, and loading of tactical imagery to the RMM. When the
RMM planning UPC was opened JMPS provided the ability to browse for preexisting images, save JMPS chart databases as images, and check which
images were relevant to the target by checking image coverage against
entered target coordinates. Figure 5.4 shows an example of the image
planning interface. During preflight planning the aircrew could select images
from the default imagery folder, browse to other folders to find images, check
target coverage, see thumbnails of selected images, see image detail, and
plan annotations. The annotation planning included the ability to draw basic
geometric shapes, text boxes, and arrows on the image to enable aircrew to
mark tactically significant features of the image, for example known location of
friendly or hostile forces. Figure 5.5 shows an example of an image
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Figure 5.4; JMPS image planning

Figure 5.5; JMPS preflight image annotation
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annotation interface. The types of annotations are shown along the left side
of the image. Up to 20 images could be grouped into one mission and the
missions could be saved as part of a F/A-18 mission for loading to the RMM.
5.2.4.2. Post flight imagery review: A new JMPS interface was added to support
post flight review of images from the RMM. After returning from a mission with
newly captured or received images, the new interface allowed aircrew to
quickly open up the images from the RMM for viewing and save them to the
JMPS computer. The interface was very similar to the preflight planning
interface to include thumbnails of the images, image detail shown below, and
ability to annotate if desired. In addition the images could be save to the
computer for use on later missions.
5.2.4.3. Selection of MIDS network: When image capable MIDS networks were built
by NCTSI they included NPG 11 timeslots in their network design
documentation. These networks could then be put on a JMPS machine and
loaded into one of the three networks that can be loaded to the AMU during
mission planning. MIDS networks available for download in JMPS are labeled
by their 9 digit alpha-numeric network ID, for example ADJE0006A.
5.2.4.4. Preflight planning of image recipients: Mission computer changes
provided a new display format that showed which Link-16 tracks were
potential image recipients. During mission planning JMPS allowed aircrew to
identify up to 8 Link-16 users (identified by Link-16 Track Number) that would
be put into the image recipient list. This list of recipients would load to the
AMU and then on to the mission computer.
5.2.5.

F/A-18 mission computer software changes to support imagery: Mission
computer changes to implement imagery included creation of new display pages,
modification of existing display pages, additional logic to enable and perform
onboard image capture, and additional logic to enable send and receive of images
over datalink.

5.2.5.1. New displays: The following new displays were implemented:
5.2.5.1.1.

Image Browse: The Image Browse page was selected by pushing a

new IMAGE pushbutton on the top-level display menu. The Image
Browse page was designed to show aircrew the list of images that
resided in the aircraft as well as show basic SSR status. Images in this
list could be selected for viewing, annotation, or sending offboard via
datalink. Additionally the Image Browse page showed the amount of
record time available on the RMM as “SSR REMAINING XX:XX” at the
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bottom of the page. Finally the Image Browse page included a
pushbutton labeled CAPTURE that enable or disabled the image
capture. Figure 5.6 shows a representative Image Browse page with two
preplanned images present on the RMM.
5.2.5.1.1.1.

Imagery list: The list of images shown on the Image Browse

page was derived from the image directory on the RMM, the location
where all preplanned, captured, and received images were stored. The
list consisted of 100 files into which images could be saved. Each line
of the list was given a file number 1-100. Updates to the Image
directory on the RMM triggered updates to the list of images in the
Image Browse page. Images were presented in pages of 10 and
aircrew were provided a means to scroll down the list to the image limit
of 100. Scrolling could be performed one image at a time or by pages
of 10.
5.2.5.1.1.2.

Information for all images: For all images the Image Browse

page showed the image name and image source. Possible labels to
indicate image sources were:
o

PRE: image had been loaded to the RMM during mission
planning

o

OWN: Image had been captured from own targeting pod

Figure 5.6; Image Browse page
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o

L16 VCS or VMF VCS: image had been received in-flight from
the named datalink participant.

Possible images names were:
o

For PRE images, any alpha-numeric that was entered in JMPS

o

For OWN images, F18-ZZZZZZ-CCC where ZZZZZZ was the
Hours, Minutes, and Seconds in Zulu time and CCC was a
sequential counter for images captured during that flight. The
counter started at 1 at the beginning of the mission and counted
up with every image. The counter number was specific to that
image throughout any changes made to the image or to the
Image Browse list.

o

For images received via datalink, as labeled by the sender. Any
alphanumeric if coming from a platform other than Super Hornet.
Images received from other F/A-18s would be labeled in the F18ZZZZZZ-CCC format.

5.2.5.1.1.3.

Selected image: The Image Browse page incorporated a select

box that graphically showed which image was currently selected for
viewing, sending, and presentation of more detailed information. The
select box could be stepped by use of pushbuttons labeled with up
and down arrows. For the currently selected image an additional set of
image data was shown as highlighted in Figure 5.6. The selected
image was “under the trigger” for viewing or sending when the Image
View or Image T/R pages were selected.
5.2.5.1.1.4.

Imagery deletion: Images could be deleted from the Image

Browse page by selecting the image to be deleted and selecting the
DELETE pushbutton. ACPT/REJ confirmation was required to delete
an image. The image list was top justified and deletion of an image
resulted in all images below moving up one space to fill the gaps. This
resulted in a change of file numbers for all images below the one
deleted as they moved up one file number to fill the gap. Deletion
could only be performed one at a time and no “group delete” or “delete
all” functions were provided.
5.2.5.1.2.

Image View page: The Image View page was reached from the

Image Browse page by selecting the VIEW pushbutton. The new Image
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View page was designed to allow viewing and modification of the images
that were listed in the Image Browse page. This retrieved the selected
image from the RMM and loaded the image into the MC, which then sent
image data to the cockpit displays to draw the image. Annotations that were
received with the image would also be displayed. If META data were
present with the image, a North up arrow would be drawn on the image to
graphically show the orientation of visual features. Aircrew were provided a
means to delete images from the View page with a mechanization identical
to that used on the Image Browse page. Figure 5.7 shows a typical Image
View page.
5.2.5.1.2.1. Step between images: The Image View page included the
ability to step between adjacent images without returning to the
Browse page. Two pushbuttons of the Image View page were
labeled with up and down arrows to allow selection of next and
previous image. During the design phase it was decided that the
up and down arrows should follow the convention of the up and
down arrows on the Image Browse page, wherein an “up”
selection moved the selection box closer to the top of the list (to a
lower file number) and “down” moved the step box lower in the list
(to a higher File number).

Figure 5.7; Image View page
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5.2.5.1.2.2. Annotation: Aircrew were provided a means to annotate areas
of interest on an image during flight. The Image View format
included an EDIT button which when pushed enabled the image
annotation features. Pressing EDIT then ADD put a triangle on the
image. The triangle could then be sized and positioned on the
image using Hands On Throttle And Stick (HOTAS) controls in
either the front or aft seat. Subsequent selections of ADD provided
up to 5 triangles for each image. Each could be individually sized
and located on the image or deleted if no longer desired. The
active annotation was displayed in yellow and inactive annotations
were displayed in white. When annotation was complete the
annotations could be saved. If further editing of annotations was
performed the SAVE option would once again be presented.
Figure 5.8 shows the Image View format with annotation
symbology.
5.2.5.1.2.3. Compression level: For images that were captured onboard,
the Image View page included a pushbutton to allow selection of
compression level. The pushbutton toggled between FAST, MED,
and SLOW which were representative of relative time required to

Figure 5.8; Image View with annotation
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retrieve and transmit the image as the compression level was changed. The
actual compression ratio associated with the FAST, MED, and SLOW
selections was determined by mission computer code. Each actuation of the
compression level pushbutton commanded a re-retrieval of the image using
the newly selected compression level.
5.2.5.1.2.4. Compression type: For images captured on board, the Image
view page included a pushbutton to select the compression type.
Aircrew were able to select JPEG or EagleEye compression by
pushbutton actuation. When the compression type pushbutton was
activated the MC re-retrieved the image using the newly selected
compression method. Compression types are discussed below.
5.2.5.1.3.

Image Transmit/Receive (T/R) page: The Image T/R page was

reached by selecting the T/R pushbutton from the Image View or Image
Browse pages. The Image T/R page was designed to allow aircrew to
manage incoming/outgoing imagery messages traveling either Link-16 or
VMF. It was graphically and functionally divided into a top half for managing
image transmission and a lower half for managing image reception. Figure
5.9 shows a representative Image T/R page.

Figure 5.9; Image T/R page
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5.2.5.1.3.1. Image transmission: The upper half of the Image T/R page was
designed for the final send command to initial datalink imagery
messages. The name and properties of the selected image were
determined by the selection box on the Image Browse page and
the compression settings on the Image View page. Recipient(s) for
Link-16 imagery messages were determined by settings on the
Link-16 NETS page. Recipient(s) for VMF imagery messages
were determined by network setup as show on the VMF NETS
page. The only options available on the Image T/R page were
selection of Link-16 or VMF and the SEND pushbutton that
initiated the datalink message. Transmission and image file data
from the last sent imagery message were displayed in the top half
of the Image T/R page.
5.2.5.1.3.2. Image reception: The lower half of the Image T/R page was
designed to help aircrew manage incoming imagery messages. A
progress cue was presented in the lower half while image
reception was in progress. After image reception was complete
and the image packets had been re-assembled into an image, a
NEW IMAGE WAITING cue was displayed in the lower half of the
Image T/R page along with ACPT/REJ options. If the image was
accepted the file was stored to the image directory on the RMM. If
the image was rejected no file would be stored to the RMM. If no
aircrew action were taken (neither ACPT or REJ) the NEW IMAGE
WAITING CUE would remain and further imagery messages
would be rejected. File and transmission status information for the
last accepted imagery message were displayed in the lower half of
the Image T/R page.
5.2.5.1.4.

Link-16 NETS page: The Link-16 NETS page was designed to show

aircrew potential recipients for Link-16 imagery. The Link-16 NETS page
was functionally and graphically divided into two halves. The right half
(labeled OBJECTIVES) was not designed for imagery functions and will not
be discussed. The left half was labeled “RECIPIENTS” and was a real time
list of Link-16 participants to whom imagery could be sent. Figure 5.10
shows a representative Link-16 NETS page.
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Figure 5.10; Link-16 NETS page
5.2.5.1.4.1. Participants: The participants were listed by Link-16 TN and
included a Link-16 VCS if they were actively exchanging Link-16
messages. The Recipients list consisted of the following
participants:
o

Up to 3 participants that had been labeled as flight members
(wingmen)

o

Up to 4 participants that had been labeled as donors (other
tactical aircraft working in the area)

o

8 preplanned participants that could be entered via JMPS
(Ground stations, command and control facilities whose TNs
were known prior to takeoff)

o

1 participant whose TN could be entered via the UFCD
(allowed manual entry of one ground station or command and
control platform whose TN was not know during pre-flight
planning)

As Link-16 participants were selected as members or donors in
flight, their TN and VCS appeared on the Link-16 NETS page. If
they were deselected their TN and VCS would be removed from
the Link-16 NETS page. This functionality allowed aircrew to
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manage the participants to whom they desired to send imagery.
5.2.5.1.4.2. Link-16 transmission method: The Link-16 NETS page
showed a pushbutton to select the transmit method that would be
used for Link-16 image transmission. The options were:
o

2 WAY: Image is sent once to a single Link-16 participant. Link
acks are expected for each image packet. This was the default
setting. Fastest and best message assurance but only works for
those who can link ack back.

o

1 WAY: The image is sent three times to a single Link-16
participant. Link acks are not expected. For message assurance
the data is transmitted three times. Slower than a 2 WAY but
works for all participants regardless of ability to Link Ack.

o

Broadcast: The Image is sent three times to all Link-16 TN in the
recipients list. For message assurance the data is transmitted
three times. Slower than 2 way but goes to multiple TNs at once.

5.2.5.1.4.3. Link-16 recipient(s): When an image was sent with broadcast
transmission method selected, the entire Link-16 recipients list
would be sent an imagery message. When an image was sent via
the 1WAY and 2WAY transmission methods only one of the TNs
in the list would be sent an imagery message. While these
transmission methods were selected the Link-16 NETS page
incorporated a step box to show the Link-16 participant who was
currently selected to receive Link-16 imagery.
5.2.5.2. Image capture: Mission computer capture logic was required to command
and control the capture of images from targeting pod video. The MC logic
included image capture enable/disable logic, the presentation of pushbuttons
that command single grabs, and automatic capture functions when A/G
weapons were released.
5.2.5.2.1.

Enable: Certain conditions were required before image capture was

enabled. These included targeting pod installed and operating, A/G
master mode selected, and targeting pod video (with time stamps)
recording to the SSR. During design a CAPTURE pushbutton was
added to the Image Browse page that controlled the SSR recording of
the targeting pod video. Figure 5.6 shows the placement of the
CAPTURE pushbutton. Additionally MC logic was implemented that
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allowed manual selection of CAPTURE boxed (pushing the CAPTURE
pushbutton) or automatic selection of CAPTURE boxed (CVRS selected
on). When CAPTURE was boxed, either manually or automatically,
recording of targeting pod video with time stamps was initiated. When
this pushbutton was subsequently selected (CAPTURE unboxed or
CVRS turned off) the recording of targeting pod video stopped. When all
preconditions for image capture were set (targeting pod on, A/G master
mode selected, CAPTURE boxed) a GRAB pushbutton was displayed
on the FLIR page. Figure 5.11 shows the placement of the GRAB
pushbutton. This GRAB pushbutton was a top-level indication that
aircrew were ready to capture still images of onboard video.
5.2.5.2.2.

Single image capture: The single “point and shoot” image capture

capability was enabled by placing the GRAB pushbutton on the FLIR
format. The GRAB label on the pushbutton indicated to the aircrew that
the system was ready to capture images.
5.2.5.2.2.1. Sequence of events: Additionally this pushbutton was the
aircrew method of commanding a single image capture.
Regardless of targeting pod mode, pushing the GRAB pushbutton
would command the capture of a single image. The sequence of
events during a single capture were:

Figure 5.11; GRAB pushbutton
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GRAB presented (system ready to capture, targeting pod video

•

with time stamps being recorded to the SSR)
Grab commanded by aircrew

•

o

MC noted “time tag” when GRAB was pushed by aircrew

o

MC presented a box around GRAB on the FLIR format
to indicate grab in progress

Image capture initiated

•

o

MC sent time tag to SSR

o

MC created an image file name and saved it to the RMM

o

MC calculated Mensuration Data (META) from targeting
pod information and saved it in a file on the RMM

o

MC created a blank annotation file and saved it to the
RMM

o

SSR found the video frame that corresponded to that
time tag

o

SSR saved the video frame as a still image in the image
directory

SSR completed save of the image to include naming the image

•

o

MC image directory updated to show new image in the
Image Browse list

o

MC unboxed GRAB on the FLIR format to indicate to
aircrew that system was ready for next GRAB

5.2.5.2.2.2. Timing: During design of the image capture system the time
projected to complete the single image capture process was 2-5
seconds. While performing image capture, the command of
another image capture cancelled the previous image capture. Two
simultaneous cues were available for aircrew to determine that the
image capture process was complete and that the system was
ready for the next capture:
o

Image name shows up in the Image Browse list

o

GRAB unboxed

5.2.5.2.2.3. Image capture end product: The video frames in targeting pod
video were 480 x 480 pixels with 8 bits for shades of gray. This
image was saved at full resolution to the RMM as TIFF images
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along with three associated files (ref [e], page 3-10):
o

META data file: contains geographic position of the image
center and fours corners as well as aircraft and sensor
orientation data

o

Annotation file: initially blank but could be filled by cockpit
annotations

o

Image name file: contained the MC generated file name and
file management data

This resulted in file sizes of approx 225k on the RMM. Onboard
images were named with the convention F18-ZZZZZZ-CCC as
described above in paragraph 5.2.5.1.1.2.
5.2.5.2.2.4. Placement in Image directory: Newly captured images were
placed in the top of the Image Browse list such that the last image
captured was always at spot #1. This design was intended to allow
aircrew to find the newest images quickly. Previously existing
images were bumped down the Image Browse list to the next
lower spot.
5.2.5.2.3.

BHA sequence: The automatic BHA sequence logic was intended to

allow aircrew to easily collect still images of the target area around
weapon impact. Preconditions to enable the BHA sequence were:
o

Release of certain types of A/G weapons for which the mission
computer knows the ballistics and can compute the time of impact.

o

GRAB present at weapon release

The conditions for GRAB present at release were the same as those for
single GRABs. The mission computer contained ballistics and was able
to compute a time of impact for all but a few A/G stores. GP bombs,
LGBs, Laser Maverick (LMAV), and JDAM weapons were all included in
the list of weapons for which BHA sequences would be commanded. For
a handful of A/G weapons BHA sequences were not commanded. These
weapons included long range weapons (JSOW) for which targeting pods
cannot provide adequate imagery and weapons for which the mission
computer was unable to determine the time of impact.
5.2.5.2.3.1. Sequence of events: Figure 5.12 graphically depicts the
timeline of events in a BHA sequence.
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Figure 5.12; Timeline for a BHA sequence


GRAB presented (system ready to capture, targeting pod video with time
stamps being recorded to the SSR)



A/G weapon release
•

MC confirmed weapon type was list of weapons for which BHA
was desired

•

MC calculated time of impact and time tags for 15 images
around the time of impact

•


MC pre-commanded capture of the images at those times

Image capture initiated (5 seconds prior to impact)
•

MC presented a box around GRAB on the FLIR format to
indicate grab in progress



•

SSR commanded to save images as the time tags were reached

•

SSR saved 16 still images to the image directory

•

Last image capture commanded at 10 seconds after impact

SSR completed save of the images to include naming the image
•

MC image directory updated to show new images in the Image
Browse list

•

MC unboxed GRAB on the FLIR format to indicate to aircrew that
system was ready for next GRAB.

5.2.5.2.3.2. Timing: The estimated time to complete BHA sequence capture
process (capture/save all 16 images and prepare for next image
capture) was approximately 90 seconds. Manually unboxing
GRAB while BHA sequence was in progress cancelled the
sequence of images. The same cues (image names saved into
Image Browse page and GRAB unboxed) provided indications to
the aircrew that the system was ready for the next image capture.
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5.2.5.2.3.3. Image capture end product: The images captured during a
BHA sequence had the same properties as those captured as
singles. The BHA sequence produced 16 images covering the
time slice 5 seconds prior to impact to 10 seconds after impact.
5.2.5.2.3.4. Placement in image directory: Newly captured images were
placed in the top of the Image Browse list such that the last image
captured was always at spot #1. This resulted in the BHA
sequence occupying the top 16 spots in the Image Browse list.
The image closest to the estimated time of impact was at file #10.
5.2.5.3. Enable imagery over datalink: Mission computer changes were required to
enable images to be sent and received over tactical datalinks. These changes
included compression of outgoing images, recognition of imagery message
formats, ability to break imagery into appropriately sized packets for
transmission, ability to re-assemble an image from received image packets.
5.2.5.3.1.

Image compression: The images captured from onboard targeting

pod video were too large to move in tactically relevant times. In order to
reduce the time required to transmit images, the design called for the
mission computer to compress the full resolution images for in cockpit
display and offboard transmission. Two types of compression were
supported to allow best interoperability with all other imagery platforms.
5.2.5.3.1.1. EagleEye (EE): The EE compression algorithm was designed by
the Boeing Company to compress images for airborne
transmission of military images. EagleEye software was not
commercially available. EE was a “near lossless” compression
algorithm which made very subtle but irreversible changes to an
image during the compression process (ref [f]).
5.2.5.3.1.2. Joint Photographers Expert Group (JPEG): The JPEG
compression algorithm was designed by the JPEG to provide
compression for commercial images. JPEG was a “lossy”
compression method which made irreversible changes to the
image during the compression process (ref [g], subject 1).
5.2.5.3.1.3. Compression ratios: JPEG compression ratios were expressed
in “Quality setting” with 100 resulting in the largest file and the
highest quality and 1 resulting in the smallest file and the lowest
image quality. EagleEye compression ratios were expressed in
“Clip setting” with 0 resulting in the largest file and the highest
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quality and 127 resulting in the smallest file and lowest image
quality. Table 5.1 shows the compression ratios used to modify
images for offboard transmission.
5.2.5.3.2.

Recognition of imagery messages: The mission computer was

required to recognize and process imagery messages that would
previously have been disregarded. The Link-16 J16.0 message and the
VMF K04.17 message were defined as imagery messages and were
added to the list of expected messages for the mission computer.
5.2.5.3.3.

Definition of image packets: Based on the transmission method

(Link-16, VMF plain, VMF encrypted), the image packets that were sent
to the datalinks were required to be different sizes in order to fit into the
allocated time slot. The mission computer changes included logic that
adjusted the size of the image packets into which an image was divided.
The different sizes resulted in different numbers of image packets to
send the image and corresponding changes in transmission time.
5.2.5.3.4.

Routing of outgoing J16.0 packets: The mission computer

determined the routing of outbound Link-16 messages to the
appropriate NPG. Outgoing Link-16 J16.0 messages were required to
be routed to the appropriate time slots on NPG 11.
5.2.5.4. Displays: The following formats required changes to support imagery:
5.2.5.4.1.

UFCD: The UFCD could be used to enter MIDS net numbers 0-127.

The UFCD previously allowed changes to NPG 9 (labeled AIC), NPG 12
and 13 (labeled VOC A and VOC B), and NPG 19 and 20 (labeled FF1
and FF2. In order to set the net number for the new NPG 11, a
previously blank UFCD pushbutton was labeled IMAGE and was used
to enter the desired net number to be used on NPG 11. Figure 5.13
shows the updates to the UFCD.
Table 5.1; Image compression ratios (ref [e], page 3-12)
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Before

After
Figure 5.13; UFCD format change

5.2.5.4.2.

MTCF: The MTCF displayed the currently selected net number for

certain NPGs. With the integration of NPG 11 for imagery the MTCF
was modified to show the currently selected net number (as selected on
the UFCD). Figure 5.14 shows updates to the MTCF.
5.2.5.4.3.

HMD/HUD: The HUD and HMD used advisory windows to alert

aircrew to the recent reception of certain types of Link-16 and VMF
messages. With the integration of imagery over datalink an IMAGE cue
was added to the HMD/HUD advisory windows to alert aircrew to the
presence of a newly received image. Figure 5.15 shows the change to
the HMD/HUD advisory window.
5.2.5.4.4.

BIT page: The BIT page showed the collective status of onboard

systems capable of reporting a BIT status. With implementation of Solid
State Recorder, which contained BIT functionality, the DISPLAYS
sublevel of the BIT page was modified to include SSR status. Due to
hardware limitations, the SSR was not given a pushbutton that could be
used by aircrew to manually command BIT of the SSR. Figure 5.16
shows the change to the BIT Displays page.
5.2.5.4.5.

Classification of images: All images were assumed to be classified

therefore all media which contained images was also assumed to be
classified. A new MSP C-code was added which informed aircrew that
the RMM contained classified files. In addition, in order to display the
images on the DDIs the MCs had to process the image prior to display.
This required the MCs to be flagged as classified as well due to the
image data present in the MC memory. Therefore viewing an image
would set classified codes for both MCs.
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Before

After
Figure 5.14; MTCF changes

Before

After

Figure 5.15; Updates to HMD/HUD advisories
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Figure 5.16; Update to BIT Displays page
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Part 4: Test and evaluation
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6.

Test and evaluation execution: The U.S Navy test and evaluation community
conducted developmental and operational test of the H2E+ SCS with SSR between
September 2004 and November 2005.Test and evaluation was performed using a wide
variety of test assets and interoperability platforms.
6.1. Test events
6.1.1.

Simulation test

6.1.1.1. Resources: The Boeing flight test group operates a dome Super Hornet
simulator with the capability to upgrade mission computer software. This
allows the U.S. Navy to send aircrew to Boeing to fly the new software
upgrades in a simulator prior to flight test. The simulator is an F/A-18F dual
seat cockpit with full displays, controls, and switchology. The simulator is able
to provide Link-16 connectivity to other simulated aircraft and ground stations.
Boeing integrated a SSR into the simulator for dedicated SSR evaluation.
6.1.1.2. Test events: Boeing and the AWL arranged two aircrew trips to St Louis to
evaluate and familiarize themselves with the H2E+ SCS with SSR. The first
simulator session was prior to the first build of H2E+ software and was the
very first AWL look at the new SCS. The second simulator session was prior
to a late build of the SCS and was used to confirm fixes to previously reported
design and implementation problems.
6.1.2.

Lab/ground test

6.1.2.1. Resources: The F/A-18 AWL had two software labs capable of running the
entire H2E+ SCS to include integrating an SSR and a targeting pod. In
addition the AWL had access to two aircraft equipped with the H2E+ SCS and
SSR for ground test events. The labs and jets were used extensively by AWL
flight test engineers to confirm subsystem functionality prior to flight. Aircrew
were involved with some lab and ground sessions.
6.1.2.2. Test events: Ground test included Electronic Emissions Evaluation (EEE)
and Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) datalink certification. Specific
test events were performed to verify image capture functionality, image
transfer between aircraft, and image transfer to ground stations. In addition
the labs were occasionally used early during flight test as an extra wingman to
which images could be sent.
6.1.3.

Flight test:

6.1.3.1. Resources: The F/A-18 AWL had access to two flight test aircraft equipped
with the H2E+ SCS and SSR. These flight test aircraft were highly
instrumented and were capable of recording all mux traffic, a wide variety of
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displays, and specific aircraft status information that would not normally be
available.
6.1.3.2. External assets: In order to advance image operability many flight test
events were planned and executed with any other platform capable of tactical
imagery. This included the F-15E Strike Eagle based out of Nellis AFB and
the Rapid Attack Information Dissemination and Execution Relay (RAIDER)
and Digital Precise Strike Suite (DPSS) ground stations based out of China
Lake.
6.1.3.2.1.

F-15E Strike Eagle: The F-15E Strike Eagle is a multi-role strike

aircraft operated by the U.S Air Force. The F-15E executed many of the
same A/G missions as the F/A-18. The latest F-15E SCS was in
operational test during the test and evaluation of the H2E+ SCS. The
new F-15E SCS provided image receive capability via Link-16 with
storage and retrieval of up to 10 images. The imagery interface included
the ability to zoom in on the viewed image. F-15E datalink design was
common with that of the F/A-18 to include use of NPG11 and the J16.0
for image transfer.
6.1.3.2.2.

RAIDER: The RAIDER system was a vehicle-based ground station

that sent and received digital targeting commands to aircraft via tactical
datalink. RAIDER incorporated both L16 and VMF datalink systems by
which tactical data could be exchanged with F/A-18. RAIDER was able
to query a national imagery databases to find up-to-date imagery of
target areas then send targeting data and imagery via L16 and VMF.
RAIDER was also able to receive images via L16 or VMF.
6.1.3.2.3.

Target Location and Designation Handoff System (TLDHS): The

TLDHS ground station consisted of a hardened laptop and a PRC-117
radio for transmission of VMF messages. TLDHS was not image
capable and did not formally participate in image testing, but provided
an important test point for VMF networks with non-image capable
participants.
6.1.3.2.4.

DPSS: The DPSS ground station consisted of a laptop computer with

image correlation programs that allowed a ground based operator to
correlate aircraft images with a national imagery database. DPSS image
correlation depended on the aircraft derived target coordinates and
META data to correlate the aircraft image with the image database.
Based on aircraft-derived META data that arrived with the image, the
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DPSS station attempted to match objects in the image scene with
objects in the database scene. If correlation was achieved the DPSS
program provided a target coordinate that could then be sent back to the
aircraft and loaded into a weapon. The confidence of the coordinate
depended on the confidence in the image correlation. The DPSS system
was not able to send or receive images during the test and evaluation of
H2E+ so images were sent to RAIDER and then hand carried to the
DPSS station.
6.2. Deficiency classification: The AWL tracked software anomalies and hardware
deficiencies using an alphabetical priority system. The classification system consisted of:
o

Priority A: Hazard to safety of flight; could cause loss of aircrew, damage to aircraft,
or release of weapons against unintended targets.

o

Priority B: Negative impact on mission effectiveness with no acceptable workaround;
could cause mission abort or failure

o

Priority C: Negative impact on mission effectiveness with an acceptable workaround
identified and briefed to users; could cause mission degrade or increased cockpit
workload

o

Priority D: Minor negative effect on mission effectiveness; could cause aircrew
nuisance

o

Priority E: Enhancement; could increase mission effectiveness or reduce cockpit
workload but no requirement was in place to provide this function

o

Pre-existing: A problem that was introduced in a previous SCS and for which there
was no requirement to improve.
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7.

Results of test and evaluation: The results of evaluation were broken into groups
that correspond to phases of an Air to Ground mission. The mission phases discussed will be
preflight planning, preflight check, postflight checks, in-flight checks, in-flight operation,
shutdown checks, and postflight mission review. While the evaluation of the H2E+ SCS with
SSR included many other aspects, only results that directly affect the tactical imagery
capability will be discussed.
7.1. Preflight planning: Preflight planning was defined as all steps that could be
accomplished at a JMPS planning station. Preflight planning was evaluated throughout
the developmental test effort to include at the simulator session and throughout flight
test. JMPS engineers, flight test engineers, and aircrew were all involved in the JMPS
evaluation.
7.1.1.

MIDS planning: MIDS planning involved finding and loading an imagery capable
network, preplanning Link-16 image recipients, and pre-planning Net numbers for
all NPGs.

7.1.1.1. Ability to determine image capability during MIDS network planning:
Aircrew ability to find, verify, and load an image capable network was
evaluated during early operational test of the H2E+ SCS. In order to use
imagery over Link-16, the JMPS plan must include an imagery capable Link16 network. Aircrew attempted to load an image capable network without
proper training and were required to re-fly two flight events due to lack of
image transmission capability when the jet was started. It was determined that
it was very easy to inadvertently load a network that was not image capable
and end up having no image datalink capability. While the consequences of
loading the wrong network were a complete shutdown of imagery, the
probability of occurrence was assessed as low for operational squadrons.
Major changes to MIDS networks or other JMPS setting would normally only
be undertaken by a designated squadron JMPS expert who would have much
better understanding of JMPS planning and MIDS network selection. Once
set correctly by the JMPS expert all squadron personnel would be able to load
an image capable network. Use of a JMPS expert was assessed as an
adequate workaround and JMPS planning of imagery capable networks was
assessed as satisfactory.
7.1.1.2. Ability to mission plan Link-16 image recipients: During JMPS planning
for MIDS, a Recipients planning window is presented which allows entry of up
to eight Link-16 TNs which would be downloaded and sent to the L16 NETS
63

page as recipients. The window clearly stated the purpose and functionality of
the page and aircrew were able to determine where to enter TNs and how
many more recipients could be planned. Errors in planning (too many digits,
attempting to enter 8s or 9s) were met with error messages that stated the
incorrect parameter and assisted with correct format. The planning of Link-16
recipients was assessed as satisfactory.
7.1.1.3. Inability to mission plan the image net number: During JMPS planning for
MIDS, net number planning was available for AIC, FF1, FF2, VOCA, and
VOCB. No option to preplan net number was designed for the Image NPG
and this design omission was correctly reflected in the MIDS planning section,
where no IMAGE net option was presented. For every MIDS power up the
IMAGE net was set to 0. All other image capable platforms (F-15E and
RAIDER) were only capable of using Image net 0. There was no method that
allowed aircrew to plan the Image net number during mission planning.
Aircrew were forced to manually change the net number if a net number other
than zero was desired. Aircrew requiring an image net number other than
zero will be required to perform additional deck checks to ensure proper
system setup. The inability to mission plan the Image net number was
assessed as unsatisfactory and assigned a priority E with a workaround of
changing the net number in the cockpit. Aircrew recommendation to provide
JMPS planning for the Image net number was deferred to a later SCS.
7.1.2.

Image planning: The ability to select, annotate, and load images from JMPS to
RMM was evaluated during both simulator sessions and throughout flight test.

7.1.2.1. Find compatible images: Imagery planning began with finding or creating
images suitable for loading. The JMPS mission planning system allowed only
JPEG or NITF images to be loaded to an RMM.
7.1.2.1.1.

JPEG image planning: JPEG images could be created on JMPS to

include a screen shot of map data imagery from the JMPS chart
database. The JPEG query and load functions then allowed that image
to the RMM. Overall the integration of JPEG images allowed great
flexibility and was assessed as satisfactory.
7.1.2.1.1.1. JPEG size: A screen shot of JMPS imagery could result in file
sizes much larger than the 1024 x 1024 pixel limit imposed by the
RMM. This limit was imposed to prevent the loading of images that
were too large to be sent offboard. In this scenario the JMPS
image planning UPC flagged the offending image with red text and
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provided a pop-up window advising of inability to load to the RMM
due to image size. The safeguards against improperly sized
images were assessed as intuitive and satisfactory.
7.1.2.1.2.

National Image Transmission Format (NITF) image planning:

NITF images available for loading included images taken from
intelligence sources and those saved from previous flight. NITF images
included data, which allowed determination of the latitude longitude
coverage of the image. JMPS was able to generate an imagery request
to be sent to the intelligence imagery center that detailed the target area
and desired image parameters. The integration of NITF image planning
was assessed as satisfactory.
7.1.2.2. Select desired images: Once images were found via JPEG query/create,
NITF query, and image request, the available images were then listed in an
imagery select window. The imagery select window included an area where
target coordinates could be entered. JMPS would then compare the entered
target coordinates with the latitude/longitude coverage of NITF images to flag
those images which included the entered coordinates. All available images
could be viewed from the list to determine image content and perspective.
The selection of imagery was assessed as satisfactory.
7.1.2.3. Annotate selected images: Images that were selected for loading to the
RMM were shown as thumbnails in the RMM planning module. Aircrew were
able to click on the image and select an Edit button that opened up an Image
annotation window. The image annotation window consisted of the image with
seven drawing and editing tools that could be used to annotate the image.
The tools included several basic geometric shapes, a text tool, and image
crop and rotation functions. Following annotation the image could be viewed
as it would be presented in flight. Aircrew were able to mark simulated friendly
and hostile position as well as label important imagery features. With one
notable exception noted below, the image annotation functions were intuitive,
easy to use, and assessed as satisfactory.
7.1.2.3.1.

Unable to discern JMPS annotation symbology on light

imagery: Annotation of images was assessed using a wide variety of
imagery sources and a wide variety of target scenes. All JMPS
generated annotations were white and there were no options to change
the color of annotations. When annotating target scenes with large
areas of light color (desert scenes, airport parking ramps, light colored
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buildings), the white JMPS symbology was difficult to find against light
colored imagery. Aircrew performing mission planning against targets in
light colored areas (deserts, man made structures) will be unable to
clearly annotate image features, resulting in confusion about target
location. The inability to discern JMPS symbology on light imagery was
assessed as unsatisfactory and assigned a priority C with a workaround
of changing symbology size to include darker areas of the image.
Aircrew recommendation to provide ability to annotate targets in light
areas was deferred to a later SCS.
7.1.2.4. Load images: After all images had been selected and annotated, the
preplanned images could be saved as a part of an overall JMPS mission that
included waypoints and MIDS setup. The imagery load process consisted of
marking the group of preplanned for download (consistent with other JMPS
functions) and selecting download. The JMPS machine then stepped through
a series of windows that loaded preplanned images to the RMM and all other
mission data to the AMU. The download of imagery to the RMM was
assessed as satisfactory.
7.2. Preflight checks: Preflight checks were defined as all activities between mission
planning and engine start.
7.2.1.

SSR checks: The outside of the SSR had no controls or indicators that could
effect or indicate SSR status. No preflight checks were required for the SSR. SSR
preflight checks were assessed as unnecessary.

7.2.2.

Unable to confirm RMM prepared for flight: RMM preparation flight required
checking the RMM to confirm that adequate record capacity remained for the
mission. Record capacity remaining could be determined while the RMM was
plugged into the JMPS machine and after power was applied to the aircraft. No
visual cues were provided on the RMM to indicate record capacity remaining.
Aircrew had no method to determine remaining record capacity between JMPS
planning and post start checks. Aircrew walking to their aircraft will be unable to
quickly confirm their recording media is ready for flight, resulting in a state of
reduced record capacity that is not discovered until after engine start, causing
mission abort or extra ground time to replace the used RMM. The inability to
confirm RMM preparation for flight was assessed as unsatisfactory and assigned a
priority E with a workaround of formatting every RMM between flights. The aircrew
recommendation to provide a visual cue on the RMM was deferred to a later SCS.
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7.2.3.

RMM loading: During preflight checks the aircrew loaded the RMM into the SSR,
much like loading a floppy disk into a disk drive. The RMM and its SSR receptacle
were asymmetrical in shape to prevent inadvertent loading of the RMM in the wrong
direction. The RMM included a handle on the outside face to allow better grip of the
RMM. The combination of shape and handle placement on the RMM provided clear
guidance for RMM orientation prior to insertion. The RMM loading was assessed as
aircrew-proof and satisfactory.

7.3. Post start deck checks: Post start checks were defined as those checks that happened
between engine start and takeoff. Following engine start and corresponding application
of power to avionics systems, the subsystems performed BIT and download of
applicable data from the AMU.
7.3.1.

VMF checks: No additional VMF checks were required to enable imagery.

7.3.2.

MIDS checks

7.3.2.1. Verify image recipients: The download of image recipients from the AMU
was confirmed by selecting the L16 NETS format and checking that
appropriate Link-16 TNs were displayed in the recipients list. Link-16
recipients that were currently in the link also showed the VCS as reported by
their PPLI. Verification of the Link 16 image recipients was intuitive and
assessed as satisfactory.
7.3.2.2. Verification and selection of own image net number: Following download
of MIDS data from the AMU the preplanned net numbers can be checked on
the MTCF (as reported by the MIDS terminal) or by TUCing own aircraft on
the SA page (as reported from own PPLI). Image net number was always 0
on startup due to the lack of mission planning for image net number. Though
no image net data was available on the SA page, the image net number could
easily be determined from the MTCF. Changes to the image net number
could be made on the UFCD in a manner consistent with changes to other
MIDS net numbers. The verification and selection of own net number was
intuitive and consistent with other MIDS net number changes. Verification and
selection of own image net number was assessed as satisfactory.
7.3.2.3. Verification that MIDS network was imagery capable: Following MIDS
startup and network download, aircrew were able to determine whether the
currently loaded Link-16 network was imagery capable by checking
symbology on the Image T/R format. If MIDS was operative but the network
was not imagery capable, the L16 pushbutton on the Image T/R page was
displayed with an X to indicate that Link-16 imagery was not currently
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possible. Aircrew were provided with indications that Link-16 imagery was not
currently available. Verification of MIDS network was assessed as
satisfactory.
7.3.3.

SSR checks

7.3.3.1. Nonexistent SSR BIT performance: The BIT performance of the SSR, as
indicated by the ability of the BIT system to cue aircrew to degraded status of
the SSR, was evaluated during lab checks, during ground checks, and in
flight. Several operational failures of the SSR were observed during ground
and flight test events. These failures were recognized by indications on the
top level FLIR page of the SSR “stuck” in image capture process indefinitely.
When the BIT status page was referenced following these failures, the SSR
status was GO. Analysis of the BIT functions of the SSR showed that the SSR
BIT functions would never provide a BIT output indicating a degraded status.
The SSR BIT functions reported GO regardless of actual health of the SSR
even with failures that were confirmed via other means. Degraded status of
the SSR could not be recognized by reference to the BIT advisory or the BIT
status page. The nonexistent SSR BIT performance will cause failure of
aircrew to recognize losses of system performance, resulting in inability to
record video or perform image capture at critical points in a mission. The
nonexistent SSR BIT performance was assessed as unacceptable and
assigned a priority B, with a poor workaround of SSR operational checks. The
aircrew recommendation to provide a useful SSR BIT function was deferred to
a later SCS.
7.3.3.2. Indications of RMM record capacity: The indications of the RMM record
capacity, as indicated by ability of aircrew to determine the hours and minutes
of available recording time, was evaluated during simulator sessions and flight
test events. Following engine start and a 90 second SSR power up cycle, the
SSR presented a time remaining cue on the Image Browse page. The time
remaining was a real-time number calculated by dividing available RMM
capacity by record rate for 3 video channels (two displays plus raw targeting
pod video). The time remaining cue compensated for failed sections of the
RMM that were not available for recording and for image and architecture files
that were present on the RMM. The SSR remaining cue was a reliable and up
to date indicator of remaining record capacity. The indications of RMM record
capacity were assessed as satisfactory.
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7.3.3.2.1.

Placement of SSR REMAINING cue: The SSR REMAINING cue

was presented on the Image browse page where it could be used to
assist in balancing image capture and video record requirements.
However the SSR remaining cue was not presented on a top level
display for quick reference. If the image format was not currently
selected, at least two and most likely three pushbutton actions were
required to check record capacity and return to the original display. The
poor placement of the SSR REMAINING cue will result in aircrew
distraction during high workload mission phases as aircrew try to quickly
determine remaining record capacity. The placement of the SSR
REMAINING cue was assessed as unsatisfactory but ranked as a
priority E due to no requirement to improve on exiting CVRS design.
7.3.3.2.2.

Inability to command maximum record capacity in the aircraft:

Maximum record capacity, to include the overwriting of previously
existing video and images, required formatting of the RMM. The JMPS
station was capable of formatting the RMM during preflight planning.
The SSR incorporated no capability to format the RMM in the aircraft.
After leaving the mission planning station the aircrew had no ability to
erase previously existing video or images in order to command
maximum record capacity. The previous 8mm tape system had no
method to rewind the tapes in the aircraft to increase record capacity.
Aircrew who have not formatted their RMM prior to flight will have
reduced record capacity and may be unable to collect video BHA or
capture onboard images, resulting in mission abort or inability to collect
BHA. The inability to command maximum record capacity in the aircraft
was assessed as unsatisfactory but pre-existing. The aircrew
suggestion to provide a “format” pushbutton in the aircraft to achieve
best record capacity was deferred to a later SCS.
7.3.3.3. Record status indications: The effectiveness of record status indications,
as indicated by the ability of aircrew to quickly determine whether cockpit
video was being recorded, was evaluated during simulator evaluation session
and during SSR integration test flights.
7.3.3.3.1.

SSR REMAINING indicator: The SSR REMAINING indicator was a

real time indicator of record capacity remaining on the RMM. As
recording took place and remaining recording capacity decreased the
SSR REMAINING indicator decremented accordingly. Aircrew were able
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to reference countdown of the SSR REMAINING indicator to confirm
that recording was underway. The real time nature of the SSR
REMAINING indicator (measurement of record capacity and comparison
with current record rate) was assessed as an enhancement that should
be incorporated in further CVRS/recording designs.
7.3.3.3.2.

Poor mechanization of the RCDR ON Light: During SSR

integration flights the RCDR ON light was illuminated when the record
switch was moved out of the OFF position. Post flight analysis of
recorded video showed several gaps in recording coverage, with the
RCDR ON light illuminated throughout. The RCDR ON light was a toplevel indication that recording had been commanded but had no ability
to alert aircrew to a degraded recording status. The poor mechanization
of the RCDR ON light will lead to unidentified recording failures with
resulting inability to confirm weapon delivery and impact. The poor
mechanization of the RCDR ON light was assessed as unsatisfactory
but pre-existing. Aircrew recommendation to make the RCDR ON light a
useful indication of record status were deferred to a later SCS.
7.4. In-flight checks: In flight checks were defined as all steps that were completed airborne
prior to entering the target area.
7.4.1.

VMF image transmission mechanization: In-flight checks included
confirming/adjusting VMF network participants on the VMF NETS page. Adjustment
of the VMF network participants was performed by marking selecting/deselecting
existing VMF participants for SEND. The ability to verify proper network setup was
evaluated during flight test with one aircraft and two VMF capable ground stations
(RAIDER and TLDHS). RAIDER was capable of receiving VMF imagery messages
but TLDHS was not. Both were marked as image recipients on the VMF NETS
page. During multiple attempts to transmit images, when aircrew attempted to send
a VMF imagery message the Image T/R page showed LAST FAIL. Analysis
showed that the MC software required all image recipients to return a link ack to the
first image packet or image transmission to all recipients would be internally
terminated. Since TLDHS was not image capable and therefore did not send a link
ack for the first image packet, the image transmission to all recipients was
terminated. Aircrew were required to carefully manage the status of the VMF NETS
and remove any non-image-capable VMF participants prior to sending a VMF
image message. The poor mechanization of VMF image transmission will result in
failed VMF image transmissions and high cockpit workload to manage the VMF
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NETS setup in order to maintain image capability. The poor VMF image
transmission mechanization was assessed as unsatisfactory and was assigned a
priority C with a workaround of aircrew managing the VMF NETS setup. Aircrew
recommendation to change the VMF image transmission mechanization to make it
common with other VMF messages was deferred to a later SCS.
7.4.2.

MIDS checks: In-flight MIDS checks included confirming/adjusting the image
recipient list on the L16 NETS page. The list of potential Link-16 image recipients
was shown on the L16 NETS page. The list could be modified by selection or
deselection of Link-16 Member/donor status or by UFCD entry of one Link-16 TN.
Selection as a member/donor was confirmed graphically on the SA page by the
presence of the donor dot on the PPLI. Modifications to the Link-16 image
recipients were simple, intuitive, and easily confirmed. In-flight MIDS checks were
assessed as satisfactory.
7.4.2.1.1.

Confirmation of recipient image net number: Net number (for

those NPGs which allow net number entry) are sent out in the MIDS
PPLI (see paragraph 2.1.4.1.3 and Figure 2.11). The requirements for
tactical imagery did not include a change to the PPLI message to
include the Image net number. When setting up MIDS to send an image
to a certain recipient, the sender was forced to confirm the recipient’s
image net number by voice since no cockpit display of the recipient's net
number was available. Aircrew were required to use voice to confirm
proper image net # setup prior to image transmission. Aircrew will be
unable to view other L16 participant’s image net number, resulting in
delayed image transmission and voice communications to determine
recipient’s net number. The inability view other MIDS participant’s Image
net # was assessed as unsatisfactory and was assigned a priority E with
a workaround of using voice communications to confirm imagery net
number. The severity of this problem was also reduced by the fact that
all imagery platforms but F/A-18 were only able to use Image Net 0.
Aircrew recommendation to include the Image net number in the PPLI
was deferred to a later SCS.
7.5. In-flight operations: In flight operations were defined as any steps that contribute to
execution of the kill chain.
7.5.1.

Lack of clear indication of record status: In order to “assess” upon return from
the mission, aircrew were required to record cockpit video in-flight. The CVRS
control panel was used to command recording. The RCDR ON light and SSR
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REMAINING indicator provided recording status information to the aircrew. Several
deficiencies are noted above regarding feedback to the aircrew that recording is
underway. However most were pre-existing and can be directly attributed to the
form-fit-function requirement. One new indication, the countdown of the new SSR
REMAINING indicator, did provide indication that recording was underway. Aircrew
interface with recording controls and indicators was, by design, largely unchanged..
Aircrew will unknowingly fail to collect cockpit video due to the poor feedback about
recording status, resulting in failure to collect BHA. The lack of clear indication of
record status was assessed as unsatisfactory but pre-existing. Aircrew
recommendation to improve recording feedback to include indications of time
remaining and individual display availability was deferred to later SCS.
7.5.2.

Single grab: The in-flight ability to grab a single image was assessed against
targets of opportunity.

7.5.2.1. Steps to prepare: Overall aircrew actions to prepare for in-flight grab were
selection of SSR recording on, selection of A/G master mode, and targeting
pod in an operative mode. Aircrew performing any A/G mission will select A/G
master mode, will have their targeting pod in an operating state, and when
finding a target of interest will command recording of cockpit displays. By
executing usual habit patterns for this mission area, aircrew were unknowingly
completing the steps required to prepare for image capture. The preparation
for image grab was intuitive and consistent with steps that aircrew were
already taking in this portion of the mission. Preparation for image capture
was assessed as enhancing and this model for aligning preparation steps with
existing tactical steps should be considered in further designs.
7.5.2.2. Confirm ready for image capture: Aircrew indication that the targeting pod
was ready to perform capture was the presence of the GRAB pushbutton on
the top level targeting pod format. GRAB was only presented when all
preparatory steps had been completed and image capture was standing by
for aircrew command. The confirmation of readiness for image capture was
presented in a clear manner on the format where it was most useful. Aircrew
were able to quickly determine the status of the image capture system. The
confirmation of readiness for image capture was assessed as satisfactory.
7.5.2.3. Capture an image: When the GRAB pushbutton was presented on the
targeting pod page, pushing the GRAB button generally resulted in the GRAB
pushbutton boxing. The box remained around GRAB for 5-8 seconds, at
which point the box was removed. The GRAB pushbutton was presented at
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the same time as the targeting pod video such that when aircrew found the
item of interest with the targeting pod they were able to immediately
command capture of the desired target (“point and shoot”). Since the time
stamp mechanization ensured that aircrew got the video frame that they were
seeing when they pushed the GRAB pushbutton, aircrew could continue to
slew the targeting pod while capture was in progress and be assured that they
got the requested image. Aircrew interface to command an image grab was
located intuitively and provided clear feedback that a GRAB had been
commanded. The aircrew interface for capturing images was assessed as
satisfactory.
7.5.2.4. Aircrew feedback on image capture progress: Two cues were provided
that image capture was complete. While image capture was in progress
GRAB was boxed on the targeting pod page. Additionally the image browse
page would indicate the presence of a new image by way of the insertion fo a
new file at File #1 (the top of the list). The image name was listed as
“SAVING” during image capture, after which the full name of the image was
presented. The removal of the box around GRAB on the targeting pod page
and the presence of the file name on the image browse page indicated that
the image capture was complete and that the system was ready for the next
command. Aircrew were able to clearly determine the status of image capture.
7.5.2.5. Find the image:
7.5.2.5.1.

Immediately after capture: New images (capture or received) were

inserted at the top file (file #1) of the image browse page. The newly
captured image could always be found at the top of the image browse
page. The time of capture could be confirmed by checking the file name
which included Zulu time. Aircrew were able to quickly find a newly
captured image.
7.5.2.5.2.

Later in flight: As other images were captured, received, and

deleted, previously existing images were moved up and down in the
image browse list. The naming convention of onboard images provided
both Zulu time and the MC counter, which could be used to clearly
remember/recall an image. The naming convention allowed simple
retrieval of the desired image despite the dynamic nature of the image
browse list.
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7.5.3.

BHA sequence: The aircrew interface for BHA sequence was designed to be
highly automated due to the high cockpit workload at and around weapons
employment.

7.5.3.1. Steps to prepare: The steps to prepare for BHA sequence included all the
steps from a single capture with the additional requirement for selection of a
weapon type that had been flagged by the MC as BHA compatible as
discussed in paragraph 5.2.5.2.3. Aircrew would be performing all these steps
in preparation for weapon employment and preparation for BHA sequence
was a byproduct of the steps for weapon employment. The steps to prepare
for BHA sequence were consistent with weapon employment steps and
provided automatic and nearly transparent BHA sequence capture. The steps
to prepare for BHA sequence capture were assessed as satisfactory.
7.5.3.2. Confirmation of readiness for BHA capture: Confirmation of the readiness
for BHA capture was exactly as described in paragraph 7.5.2.2.
7.5.3.3. BHA capture execution: The BHA sequence was automatically performed
when a weapon was released with GRAB presented. No aircrew action was
necessary to initiate the BHA sequence.
7.5.3.4. Feedback on progress:
7.5.3.4.1.

Start of BHA sequence: At 5 seconds prior to MC calculated impact

(which is displayed on the FLIR page) the GRAB option boxes itself.
The BHA sequence could be manually cancelled by unboxing GRAB
during the BHA sequence. In order to confirm that the BHA sequence
had properly started aircrew checked a pushbutton on the top level of
the primary targeting sensor. The feedback cue was well placed and
provided a quick and easily referenced indication that BHA sequence
was underway. The feedback of BHA sequence in progress was
assessed as satisfactory.
7.5.3.4.2.

End of BHA sequence: During BHA sequence capture the MC

commanded the capture of multiple 15 images from the SSR. While the
capture was in progress (approx 90 seconds) for the 15 images the MC
presented a box around the GRAB option on the FLIR page. Additionally
on the image page the new 15 images would fill in the top 15 spots and
move pre-existing images down the list. Each image was initially marked
as SAVING and when save was complete the image name was filled
into the Image Browse list. Figure 7.1 shows a representative Image
browse page during BHA sequence capture. Simultaneously the GRAB
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Figure 7.1; Image Browse page during BHA sequence capture
option unboxed on the FLIR format. Aircrew were provided two cues that
the BHA sequence capture was complete, one each on the two formats
most related to the BHA sequence. The cockpit indications that the BHA
sequence was complete were assessed as satisfactory.
7.5.3.5. Find BHA sequence images: The new images were inserted at the top of
the Image Browse list in the top 15 files. Previously existing images were
moved lower in the list. The images from the latest BHA sequence were easy
to find and select for viewing. The viewing of BHA sequence images was
assessed as satisfactory.
7.5.4.

Image view: The image view page showed the actual image for the currently
selected imagery file. Preplanned images and received images were shown at
native resolution while captured images were initially shown compressed to FAST
speed in EagleEye format. The image view page provided an interface to draw
annotations on the image to mark points of interest.

7.5.4.1. Image selection: The Image view page showed the currently selected
image, to include current file number, as well as up and down arrows to allow
selection of adjacent images from the image browse list. The Image Browse
list was arranged with file #1 on the top with file number counting down the
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page as shown in Figure 5.6. The mechanization of the up and down arrows
on the Image View page was designed to be consistent with that on the
Image Browse page, resulting in the up arrow selecting the next smaller file
number and the down arrow selecting the next larger file number. Aircrew
were initially confused by the mechanization of the up/down arrows but when
the consistency with the Image Browse format was explained they were able
to use the Up/Down arrows to select the desired image. The mechanization of
image selection from the Image View page was assessed as satisfactory with
the condition that aircrew training was required. The mechanization of the up
and down arrows presented the most interesting human factors design
question of this project and consistency with other formats won the day.
7.5.4.2. Image compression: Captured images were shown saved at 100%
resolution but displayed as compressed images in order to show what could
be sent over tactical datalink. The Image View page provided options to select
compression rate and compression type. Image compression was a
necessary evil due to limitations of available datalinks.
7.5.4.2.1.

JPEG vs EE compression: Two types of compression were

available to provide best flexibility. Some imagery platforms (F-15E) only
accepted EE images while other platforms (RAIDER) only accepted
JPEG images. Switching an image between EE and JPEG resulting in
very little change in the Super Hornet cockpit. The use of two types of
compression provided one more potential stumbling block to aircrew
trying to send images. The dual compression types were assessed as a
necessary evil. The aircrew recommendation was to standardize image
types between imagery platforms to minimize potential confusion.
7.5.4.2.2.

FAST vs MED vs SLOW: For both compression types, three

compression rates were available. They were named by relative speed
to transmit the images. FAST images were the smallest files and fastest
to transmit but were of the lowest visual quality. SLOW images were the
largest files and slowest to transmit but were of the highest visual
quality. The default setting for captured images was FAST to allow most
rapid toggle through the images. Paragraph 7.5.6.2.2.2 contains a full
discussion of tactical utility of different compression settings.
7.5.4.3. Image orientation: The orientation of images to match aircraft-target relative
position was evaluated in flight. The Image View page had no method of
rotating or changing the orientation of the image. In flight the aircrew were
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required to mentally rotate the image to their run in heading to determine how
the target would look from the run in heading. Aircrew had no reliable means
to rotate or orient the picture in order to show the image from the current
perspective of the aircrew. The inability to orient the image to current run-in
heading was assessed as unsatisfactory but was assigned a priority E due to
the lack of requirements to implement this function. Aircrew recommendation
was to provide a UFCD entry for run in heading (for images with META data)
or rotation degrees (for images with no META data) that would allow aircrew
rotate the image to perspective of the aircrew.
7.5.4.3.1.

North up arrow: For captured images the MC calculated four corner

data that was saved in the META data file. This META data was then
used to draw a North up arrow on the Image View page. During flight
test the North up arrow was observed to deviate from actual North by up
to 180 degrees. Analysis showed that the META data was being
incorrectly written by the MCs, which resulted in incorrect orientation of
the North up arrow. The incorrect orientation of the North up arrow
provided false and confusing information about the orientation of
features in the image and therefore provided false cues to aircrew
attempting to mentally rotate the image to their perspective. Aircrew who
reference the North Up arrow to determine image orientation will see
false and misleading information about image orientation, resulting in
confusion about relative placement of target area features and potential
misidentification of targets. The incorrect orientation of the North Up
arrow was assessed as unsatisfactory and assigned a priority C with a
workaround of ignoring the North up arrow on captured images. Aircrew
recommendation to remove the North up arrow so as to not display false
information was rejected by project management. Aircrew
recommendation to make the North up arrow point north was deferred to
a later SCS.
7.5.4.4. Image annotation: Image annotation was assessed using wide variety of
target images and target types. Image annotation was performed on the view
page using pushbutton selections to command annotations and HOTAS
controls to size and slew the annotations. When complete the annotation file
was saved as an image overlay and was sent over datalink with the image.
The HOTAS controls and PVI were intuitive and provided easy annotation of
any desired image feature. The Image annotation provided a powerful tool for
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pointing out critical points within most images. With the below exceptions,
image annotation was satisfactory.
7.5.4.4.1.

Unable to discern annotation symbology on light imagery: Same

issue as described in as paragraph 7.1.2.3.1 also applied to annotations
performed in flight. Aircrew attempting to annotate visual features
against targets in light colored areas (deserts, man made structures)
would be unable to clearly annotate image features, resulting in
confusion about annotation placement and potential misidentification of
targets. The inability to discern annotation symbology on light imagery
was assessed as unsatisfactory and assigned a priority C. Aircrew
recommendation to provide the ability to view annotations in light target
areas was deferred to a later SCS.
7.5.4.4.2.

Unable to draw different symbols: Annotation was assessed with

images that contained simulated hostile and simulated friendly sites.
The only annotation shape available for in-flight annotation was a
triangle pointed up. When attempted to point out both friendly and
hostile sites aircrew had to use the same shape annotation. Aircrew
were unable to differentiate between types of visual features in an
image and had only one symbol for use in annotating features with
different meanings. Aircrew attempting to mark both hostile and friendly
areas in the same image were forced to use the same symbol, resulting
in confusion about the meaning of the symbology when sent to other
aircraft and potential misidentification of the target. The inability to draw
more than one shape of symbol was assessed as unsatisfactory and
was assigned a priority E due to lack of requirement to provide this
function. Aircrew recommendation to provide at least two types of
annotation shape was deferred to a later SCS.
7.5.5.

Image management: The RMM architecture supported 100 image files that
could be filled with preplanned images, captured images, or received images.

7.5.5.1. Image deletion: The Image View page provided a DELETE option for the
currently selected image. Deletion required a follow on ACCEPT from the
aircrew before the image file was deleted. Deletion of the image deleted that
image and moved all images that were lower in the Image Browse list up to fill
the empty space. Deletion mechanization was limited to one image at a time
and there was no method to delete multiple images at once. Aircrew were
able to quickly delete single images but were unable to quickly delete groups
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of images. Aircrew attempting to delete numerous unwanted image will be
required to individually delete the images, resulting in higher cockpit workload.
The inability to delete groups of images was assessed as unsatisfactory and
assigned a priority E due to no requirement to perform group deletion. Aircrew
recommendation to provide group deletion functions were deferred to a later
SCS.
7.5.5.2. Maximum number of pictures: If the image directory was full (all 100 files
filled) the GRAB label on the FLIR format was Xd out to indicate to aircrew
that image capture was no longer available and that aircrew must go delete
images to enable further image capture. The indications of GRAB disabled
were displayed on the correct format in an intuitive manner. Cockpit
indications of full image directory was assessed as satisfactory.
7.5.6.

Image send

7.5.6.1. Image selection/verification: Image selection was performed by placing the
select box on the desired image on the Image Browse page or by viewing the
desired image on the Image View page. Throughout the image transmission
process, aircrew were able to quickly verify which image was selected for
transmission. Image selection and verification were assessed as satisfactory.
7.5.6.2. Image options: Once the desired image was selected, aircrew had options
to select compression type (will be called image type) and rate of
compression.
7.5.6.2.1.

Image type: Image type options of EE and JPEG were provided to

allow maximum flexibility. The default image type for captured images
was EE. Certain image platforms were only capable of one type of
image (F-15E only able to use EE, RAIDER only able to use JPEG).
Selection between types was available on a pushbutton on the Image
View page. Sending an incompatible image type resulted in either a
failed transmission (LAST FAIL cue on Image T/R page) with no image
received or a good apparent transmission (LAST PASS on Image T/R
page) with a garbled image on the receiver’s displays. Image type
selection was easy to perform but was easy to get wrong when sending
to image platforms that required a specific image type. While the
selection of image type was assessed as satisfactory, overall image
compression was assessed as a significant addition of complexity to
allow flexibility. Aircrew recommendation to push for overall inter-service
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and inter-platform agreement on image type to reduce complexity was
deferred to a later SCS.
7.5.6.2.2.

Image compression: Image compression options of FAST, MED,

and SLOW were provided to allow aircrew flexibility to send high or low
quality images. The default compression setting for captured images
was FAST to allow most rapid stepping through the images. Details of
image transmission times and image quality are discussed below. While
the selection of image compression rate was assessed as satisfactory,
overall image compression was assessed as a necessary addition of
complexity to allow flexibility. The aircrew recommendation to
investigate improved compression or transmission methods to eliminate
the need for aircrew to select a compression setting was deferred to a
later SCS.
7.5.6.2.2.1. Transmission times: For a given image and a given
transmission method, image compression rate determined image
file size which determined image transmit time. Figure 7.2 shows
predicted image transmission times based on theoretical image
compression and transmission capabilities. Predicted times
assumed specific image sizes based on compression ratios shown
in Table 5.1. Figure 7.3 shows actual image transmission times
taken from test and evaluation flights. Error bars in the horizontal
reflected the presentation of image size to the nearest kb. The
wide variety of observed image sizes reflected the difference in
compression between images with varying content. Based on
differing image content (dark/light pixels) the same compression
settings yielded differing compressed image sizes. Dark pictures
compressed to smaller images. Changes in compression rate
resulted in image transmit times between 15 and 142 seconds.
7.5.6.2.2.2. Image quality: The quality of images of different compression
was evaluated qualitatively against a wide variety of target areas
and target backgrounds. FAST image quality was the lowest
quality and provided general target area features only. The target
coordinates generated by the targeting pod were unreadable.
From a captured image of a vehicle driving on a road, aircrew
viewing a FAST image in flight might be able to detect the
presence of a vehicle but might be unable to identify which kind of
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Figure 7.2; Predicted image transmission time

Figure 7.3; Observed image transmission times
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vehicle was shown. MEDium images were of intermediate quality
and provided most target area features. Targeting pod coordinates
were legible and most details that were seen on the targeting pod
video when the image was captured were legible when viewed under
MED compression in flight. SLOW images were of the highest quality
and provided all target area features. When viewed in an F/A-18
cockpit MED and SLOW showed very little difference in target area
features. However when viewed in other platforms with the ability to
zoom in on the image, SLOW images showed improved resolution
when zoomed. All three image compression rates were assessed as
having a useful place in tactical imagery. FAST images were used as
“thumbnail” pictures that quickly allowed the aircrew to decide if an
image should be delete, kept, and/or transmitted. However, FAST
images were not assessed to have tactical utility when sent offboard
due to the low quality of target area imagery and the unreadable
target coordinates. MED provided tactical information to include
target coordinates and was the best compromise of speed and
quality. SLOW images provided the most tactical utility and were
preferred for ground systems using image correlation algorithms to
match coordinates.
7.5.6.2.2.3. Link-16 vs. VMF: Image transmission was compared between
the two parallel datalinks. Figure 7.2 shows predicted image
transmission times for VMF and Link-16 with VMF imagery taking
approximately twice as long to move the same image. Figure 7.3
shows observed image transmission times. Link-16 imagery
transmission times were slightly longer than predicted but were
assessed as generally consistent as evidence by linear
relationship of image size and transmission time (with a few
notable exceptions). While VMF data is limited, VMF transmission
times were noticeably longer than those of Link-16 and showed a
less consistent image size vs. transmission time trend. The limited
VMF data reflects the aircrew preference for Link-16 for imagery
exchange due to lower transmission times and more consistent
transmission results. While both datalinks were found to be
satisfactory for moving images, Link-16 was found to be a faster
and more consistent method of image exchange. This assessment
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was passed along to fleet users as a tactical recommendation to
use Link-16 when available and only use VMF with imagery users
that were only capable of exchanging pictures via VMF.
7.5.6.3. Recipient selection:
7.5.6.3.1.

L-16 recipient: The L16 NETS page provided a list of all available

image recipients. Link-16 participants not currently displayed on the L16
NETS page could be added to the list by way of a UFCD option to enter
a Link-16 TN. Options were presented to allow transmission to all TNs
on the L16 NETS page or to just one TN that was indicated by the
presence of a selection box. Selection of one or all L16 image
recipient(s) was assessed as satisfactory.
7.5.6.3.1.1. Selection of multiple image recipients: Options were
presented to allow transmission to all TNs on the L16 NETS page
or to just one TN that was indicated by the presence of a selection
box. No option was presented to pick and choose multiple L16
recipients without sending to the entire L16 NETS list. In order to
send an image to just three recipients from the L16 NETS list,
aircrew forced to send the image three times, once to each of the
three recipients. Aircrew attempting to send an image to multiple
recipients will be unable to quickly select intended recipients and
will be forced to execute extra steps or send the image to
unintended recipients The inability to select multiple image
recipients was assessed as unsatisfactory and assigned a priority
E due to no requirement to perform this function. Aircrew
recommendation to provide “pick and choose” capability on the
L16 NETS page was deferred to a later SCS.
7.5.6.3.1.2. VMF recipient: With the exception of paragraph 7.4.1, selection
of VMF recipients was assessed as satisfactory.
7.5.6.4. Controls and indications of transmit method: The image transmission
could be changes between VMF and L16 using a pushbutton presented on
the Image T/R page. The pushbutton showed the currently selected
transmission method. If one transmission method was not available that
transmission method would be Xd out to indicate not ready to transmit.
Aircrew were able to quickly determine currently selected image transmission
method and quickly change it of required. Controls and indications of image
transmission method were assessed as satisfactory.
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7.5.6.5. Commanding image transmission: The Image T/R page provided a SEND
pushbutton that would send the currently selected image to the currently
selected recipient(s) using the currently selected image transmission method
(VMF or L16), the currently selected image type (EE or JPEG), and the
currently selected compression rate (FAST/MED/SLOW). Commanding
transmission was easy and intuitive. Controls to command image
transmission were assessed as satisfactory.
7.5.6.5.1.

Feedback of IMAGE transmission progress: When SEND was

selected on the Image T/R page three indicators were presented to the
aircrew. The first was an elapsed time counter that displayed time since
SEND was selected. The second was estimated time left to complete
image transmission. The third was a percent counter that counted from
0 to 100 percent to show transmission of image packets. All
transmissions showed a count up of elapsed time. Successful
transmissions were indicated by the estimated time left counting down
and the percent complete counter counting up. Upon successful link ack
back from the last image packet the estimated time left displayed 0 and
the percent complete counter showed 100. In addition a LAST PASS
cue was displayed in the middle of the IMAGE T/R format to indicate
that the last image transmission was successful. Partially successful
image transmissions (long range, missed image packets) showed
continued elapsed time count up, a stagnant estimated time remaining,
and a stagnant % complete counter. Completely unsuccessful image
transmissions (network incompatibility, incorrect recipients selected)
were indicated by no countdown in estimated time, percent complete
stuck at 0, and after 15 seconds of no transmission a LAST FAIL cue
accompanied by clearing of all counters to indicate that image
transmission had been terminated. Aircrew were able to monitor the
real-time status of image transmission using cues on the Image T/R
page. The feedback of image transmission progress was assessed as
satisfactory.
7.5.7.

Image reception

7.5.7.1. Cockpit cues of image enroute: The lower half of the image T/R page
showed reception status. When imagery packets were being received via
Link-16 or VMF, the Image T/R page showed a percent complete counter, a
time elapsed counter, and an estimated time left counter. No top-level
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indication was provided to indicate that image reception was in progress.
Aircrew were able to monitor image reception if cued by voice communication
that an image was enroute. While the cues of image reception were easily
missed, this portion of the mission did not require aircrew interaction. Cockpit
cues of image reception were assessed as satisfactory.
7.5.7.2. Cockpit cues of image reception complete
7.5.7.2.1.

Short duration of the cue of Link 16 image reception: Upon

arrival of a complete L16 image, the HUD and HMD displayed an
IMAGE cue that flashed for 10 seconds. Aircrew in the aft seat who had
no HUD or HMD had no image cue to indicate the arrival of a new L16
image. Analysis of the design showed the 10 seconds was chosen to be
consistent with other MIDS cueing. Additionally analysis of image
reception indicated that reception of further images was inhibited until
the current image was accepted or rejected. Aircrew will be required to
use voice to advise of image transmission to cues image recipients that
they should go check for new image. The short duration of the cue of
Link-16 image reception was assessed as unsatisfactory and was
assigned a priority E due to no requirement to deviate from MIDS
convention for message reception. Aircrew recommendation to continue
flashing of the IMAGE cue until aircrew select the Image T/R page was
deferred to a later SCS.
7.5.7.2.2.

VMF image reception: Upon arrival of a complete VMF imagery

message, the HUD and HMD displayed a flashing IMAGE cue that
flashed until the Image T/R page was selected. Aircrew were presented
with persistent indications that a new image was available. The cockpit
cue of VMF imagery reception was assessed as satisfactory.
7.5.7.3. Image confirmation: When the Image T/R page was selected following the
reception of a new Link-16 or VMF image, three cues of a new image were
presented. A NEW IMAGE CUE was displayed in the bottom of the Image T/R
display and REJ and ACPT options were presented. Information about the
image (sender, message type) was displayed below the NEW IMAGE
WAITING cue. Selecting the REJ option rejected the image which consisted
of resetting image receive capability without saving the image to the SSR.
Selecting the ACPT option saved the image to the SSR then reset the image
reception system for reception of the next image. The image ACPT/REJ
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functionality allowed aircrew to manage which images were saved to the
SSR. The image confirmation was assessed as satisfactory.
7.5.7.4. Misleading pushbuttons on the Image T/R page following image ACPT:
Upon reception of a new image and selecting ACPT, the new image was
saved into the image directory and was available for viewing on the Image
Browse page. However the currently selected image did not change with
reception of a new image. Therefore the VIEW pushbutton on the Image T/R
page commanded display of the currently selected image, which was not
necessarily the same as the newly received image. The presentation of
pushbuttons on the Image T/R page provided misleading functionality.
Aircrew attempting to VIEW a newly received image can select an image that
they think is the new image, resulting in confusion as to the features in the
target area and potential misidentification of the target. The misleading
pushbutton on the Image T/R page following image ACPT was assessed as
unsatisfactory and assigned as priority C with a workaround of manually
selecting the newly received image. The aircrew recommendation to provide a
VIEW NEW pushbutton after image reception was deferred to a later SCS.
7.5.8.

Interoperability considerations: Test and evaluation with imagery included
operations with all available imagery capable platforms to include the RAIDER
ground station and the F-15E Strike Eagle.

7.5.8.1. Very few image capable platforms: During early F/A-18 imagery
development numerous airborne and ground platforms advertised the
development of imagery transmission and receive capability. However during
H2E+ developmental flight test only two other platforms (RAIDER, F-15E) had
imagery capability that could be used to check H2E+ interoperability. Other
platforms (to include such ground stations as BOSS, TLDHS, DPSS-SOF,
and airborne platforms such as the E-3A Sentry and the E-2C Hawkeye) were
not available to test. The slow development of other platform’s imagery
capability posed a risk of interoperability problems due to the completion and
fleet release of H2E+. Interoperability problems found with those platforms will
have to be found through follow on testing and addressed through a later
SCS. The recommendation was made to perform further testing to ensure
imagery interoperability with new image platforms.
7.5.8.2. File types: See paragraph 7.5.6.2.1. While the selection of image type was
assessed as satisfactory, the use of two different image compression
methods was assessed as a significant addition of complexity to allow
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flexibility for interoperability with all platforms. Aircrew recommendation was to
push for overall inter-service and inter-platform agreement on image type to
reduce complexity.
7.5.8.3. F-15E considerations: The F-15E Strike Eagle is a multi-role strike aircraft
operated by the U.S Air Force. The F-15E was developing image receive
capability to include reception of up to 10 EagleEye images. The imagery
interface included the ability to zoom in on the viewed image.
7.5.8.3.1.

Image type: The F-15E imagery interface accepted only EE

imagery. When F/A-18 aircrew attempted to send JPEG images to F15E, cockpit indications in both aircraft showed good transmission but
the F-15E showed that the image type was invalid. Analysis showed that
the F-15E was correctly identifying the compression type and rejecting
the image as the compression type was not supported. F-15E cockpit
indications were clear that the image was not useable.
7.5.8.3.2.

Annotations not displayed in F-15E cockpit: During flight test with

F-15E Strike Eagles, F/A-18 aircrew captured a targeting pod image
with the targeting pod pointed toward (but not directly at) the target. The
targeting pod reticle, always shown in the middle of the image, was not
on the target. The F/A-18 aircrew then annotated a target away from the
center of the targeting pod video using the annotation functions on the
VIEW page. When the image was received in the F-15E cockpit the
annotations were not displayed, causing misunderstanding of the
location of the intended target and an aborted attack as the F-15E
began an attack on a target other than the intended target. Analysis
showed that the F-15E does not use or display the annotation portion of
the image file so the F-15E aircrew saw the image with the targeting pod
symbology in the middle. Figure 7.4 shows the difference in symbology.
F/A-18 aircrew were not able to use annotations to point out targets or
significant features in the image. F/A-18 aircrew attempting to use
annotations to mark targets with F-15E will not have their annotations
show up in the F-15E cockpit, resulting in confusion about target
location and potential release of weapons against the wrong target. The
lack of annotations in the F-15E cockpit was assessed as an
interoperability problem that must be addressed through training.
Aircrew recommendation to have F-15E display image annotations was
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Sent from F/A-18

Received in F-15E

Figure 7.4; Potential for confusion about target location
met with roaring laughter from the USAF as U.S Navy guys tried to tell
U.S. Air Force guys how to make their jet work.
7.5.8.4. RAIDER ground station: The RAIDER ground station is a ground based
computer system that can send and receive Link-16 or VMF messages. The
RAIDER system is designed to be positioned within communications range of
a ground command and control station and is used to disseminate targeting
data to aircraft. RAIDER capabilities include the ability to generate and send
target imagery, the ability to receive imagery from aircraft, and the ability to
pass those images on to other ground based applications to include DPSS
software.
7.5.8.4.1.

Presence of imbedded targeting pod symbology: As described in

paragraph 2.1.3.5, the targeting pod video from which images are
captured includes video imagery and targeting pod generated
symbology to include target coordinates, tracking gate symbology, and
field of view symbology. The presence of this symbology is controlled by
the RTCL option on the FLIR page. When RTCL is boxed (the default
state) the symbology is displayed and when RTCL is unboxed (manually
selected) the symbology is not presented. Future enhancements to U.S
Navy targeting pods will include more symbology in the targeting pod
video. During flight test with ground stations using image correlation
technology, ground station operators reported poor correlation
confidence. Analysis showed that the embedded targeting pod
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symbology introduced pixels in the image that could not be correlated to
features on the ground and reduced the confidence of image correlation
algorithms. When attempting to correlate an image with targeting pod
symbology, the image correlation algorithm was unable to match the
pixels that corresponded to the targeting pod symbology with its imagery
database. This resulted in low correlation confidence and inability to
mensurate any coordinates out of the image. Aircrew recommendation
was to deselect the RTCL option when capturing images intended for
transmission to image correlation ground stations, minimizing the extra
symbology and allowing best correlation confidence.
7.5.8.4.2.

Image type: The RAIDER ground station initially accepted only

JPEG images. When F/A-18 aircrew sent EE image to RAIDER the
aircrew noted LAST FAIL indications and 0 percent complete. Analysis
showed that RAIDER was rejecting the EE image packets and that the
F/A-18 was correctly identifying the lack of link ack for image packets
and failing the transmission. F/A-18 cockpit indications were clear that
the image had failed. During later image development RAIDER
incorporated both EE and JPEG image types.
7.5.9.

Declassify the RMM in flight: The ability to declassify the RMM in the aircraft
was evaluated during lab and ground test events. Time required to perform
classified erase of the RMM was 4 hours and 40 minutes. Most F/A-18 missions are
less than 2 hours in duration and most scenarios that require in-flight
declassification (emergency divert) involve significantly less than 2 hours of
available flight time. The very long time required to declassify the RMM was not
useable. Analysis showed that the lack of in-flight erase was no worse than the
previously existing 8MM tapes. Aircrew will be unable to declassify the RMM during
an emergency divert resulting in potential compromise of classified information at
pseudo-friendly divert locations such as Chinese islands. The lack of ability to
declassify the RMM in-flight was assessed as unsatisfactory and assigned a priority
E based on no requirement to be better than the existing 8mm tapes. Aircrew
recommendation to provide rapid erase ”flash” RMMs was deferred to a later SCS.

7.6. Shutdown checks: Shutdown checks were defined as all actions required between
landing and engine shutdown.
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7.6.1.

SSR shutdown:

7.6.1.1. Save images for postflight review: The images and associated files were
already saved in a format conducive to save on JMPS. No aircrew action was
required to prepare image or video for shutdown.
7.6.1.2. Switchology for shutdown: The CVRS record panel provided a record
control switch that could be placed to the OFF position to stop recording of
displays and raw targeting pod video. There was no adverse effect of
performing engine shutdown prior with the CVRS switch not OFF.
Switchology for shutdown was assessed as satisfactory.
7.7. Postflight debriefing: Postflight debriefing was defined as all activities to reconstruct
the flight at the JMPS machine.
7.7.1.

Image debriefing:

7.7.1.1. Image download: Postflight download of images that were captured or
received in-flight was performed on JMPS stations. The RMM was connected
via external firewire to the JMPS machine. The JMPS menus provided an
option to “Extract RMM Data.” When this option was selected the JMPS
machine read the image directory of the RMM, opened a RMM post flight
window, and presented the downloaded images as thumbnails. Individual
images were opened in an Image View window with a full resolution view of
the image and its associated data (name, data and time take, classification,
META data).
7.7.1.1.1.

Image selection: The Image View showed one image at a time.

Selection of adjacent images was performed by closing the Image View
window and opening a new Image View window for the adjacent image.
There was no method provided to quickly step between images on the
image view window. Aircrew attempting to compare adjacent images
taken from a BHA sequence were required to open and close images
individually. Aircrew debriefing their captured images could miss
changes to image content due to the ability to quickly step between
images. The inability to compare adjacent images was assessed as
unsatisfactory and assigned a priority C with a workaround of using
Windows based screen capture to compare images. Aircrew
recommendation to provide Next Image/Previous Image selection as
well as slideshow mode on the Image View window was deferred to a
later SCS.
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7.7.1.2. Image save: Images could be saved to the JMPS computer for use on later
flights or for collection by intelligence personnel to evaluate target imagery.
Commanding an image save resulted in the image and its three associated
files being grouped and saved into a NITF file.
7.7.1.2.1.

Selection for saving: The JMPS RMM post flight window provided

options to save one image or save all images. There was no option to
pick and choose images to be saved. Aircrew had to save image one by
one or accept that extraneous images would also be saved. Aircrew
attempting to save a partial set of images during post flight debriefing
will be required to save the images individually or accept save of
extraneous images. The inability to pick and choose images for saving
was assessed as unsatisfactory and assigned a priority C with a
workaround of saving all images. Aircrew recommendation to allow pick
and choose functionality for saving images was deferred to a later SCS.
7.7.1.2.2.

Lack of NITF viewer on JMPS: JMPS did not include an NITF

image viewer. Standard Windows based image viewing applications will
not open an image in NITF format. The only method available for
viewing NITF images was to simulate planning a new imagery mission,
which provided the Image View window with the image displayed.
Aircrew were required to use JMPS mission planning software to view
images saved to the computers. Aircrew will be unable to quickly view
tactical images between flights, resulting in excessive timeline and
workaround to view an existing NITF image. The lack of NITF viewer
was assigned a priority C with a workaround of using the Image
planning UPC to view the images. Aircrew recommendation to provide a
NITF viewer was deferred to a later SCS.
7.7.2.

Video debriefing: The RMM and its associated playback system provided
playback of cockpit display video the raw targeting pod video from which the
images were captured. Using the image name, which included the time of image
capture, aircrew were able to quickly go to the time of image capture to see full
resolution video frames and see the flow of the mission before and after the image
capture to include image transmission setting and switchology. The video playback
allowed aircrew to quickly jump to the desired portion of the mission to reconstruct
captured, received, and transmitted images and their contribution to the mission.
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8.

Conclusions

Overall the tactical imagery integration on the F/A-18 Super Hornet with the H2E+ SCS and SSR
provided increased mission capability to the F/A-18 and the ability to shorten and simplify
selected steps in the kill chain.
Highlights of the evaluation of tactical imagery as integrated into the Super Hornet with H2E+
SCS and the SSR included:
Strengths:
o

Image capture logic is simple and involves steps that were already being executed.

o

Image annotation is simple and intuitive.

o

Image transfer has proven to work well with compatible platforms.

Weaknesses
o

There is no SSR BIT functionality to warn aircrew of a system degrade that could prevent
image capture.

o

The necessity for image compression (to make images fit within existing datalinks) results
in complicated options to prepare an image for datalink transmission.

o

There are very few L-16 or VMF image platforms with which images can be exchanged.

o

Aircrew are unable to review and capture images from cockpit video recorded to the SSR
while in flight.

Overall lessons learned
o

Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) technology must be verified to ensure proper BIT
functionality.

o

A requirement that strictly limits newer and more capable systems to “Form fit function”
replacement can result in squandering significant potential for increased capability.

o

It is difficult to develop and test emerging technologies that rely on interoperability due to
the limited number of other platforms that are capable of exchanging information.

o

Flexibility in design often leads to complexity of design (as exemplified by selectable
image compression types and rates)
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9.

Recommendations
9.1. Recommendations for use by fleet aircrew: The following recommendations were
distributed during fleet training to squadrons equipped with H2E+ and SSR.
9.1.1.

Mission planning:

o

USE NITF images when possible

o

Use JPEG images only when required and carefully monitor the size of image
produced

9.1.2.
o
9.1.3.
o
9.1.4.
o

Preflight checks
Format the RMM prior to every flight
Poststart checks
Check SSR GO, SSR REMAINING counter, GRAB functionality prior to launch
Inflight checks
Check SSR GO, SSR REMAINING counter, GRAB functionality prior to
commencing operational portion of mission

9.1.5.

Inflight operations

9.1.5.1. Capture
o

Singles: CVRS on, A/G, point and shoot

o

BHA sequence: Do what you’ve been doing, images will show up

9.1.5.2. Image transmission
o

Use Link-16 image transmission when possible

o

Use VMF only when required

o

Use FAST to toggle through images

o

Send MED or SLOW images

o

Use voice transmission to advise recipient of incoming image
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9.1.5.3. Image reception
o

Watch for IMAGE cue in HUD/HMD

o

Use voice with sender to confirm reception of image

o

Carefully check that you select the new image for viewing

9.1.6.

Other platforms

o

When working with F-15E, send EE images with no annotations

o

When working with image correlation ground stations, send images with minimal
symbology

9.2. Recommendation for further development:
9.3. JMPS development
9.3.1.Annotate in black/white/halo: Make JMPS changes to allow aircrew to clearly
annotate images with any color background. Suggested solutions:
o

Halo all imagery annotations

o

Provide a manual black/white toggle that changes the color of annotation

9.3.2.Tag Image capable networks: Make JMPS changes to allow aircrew to clearly
tell which MIDS networks are image capable. Suggested solutions:
o

During network selection tag all image capable networks with (Image)

o

During network selection provide a network filter to allow aircrew to view
only networks with specified properties (View only image capable
networks).

9.3.3.Arrows to scroll left/right during debriefing: Make JMPS changes that allow
aircrew to quickly scroll through consecutive images during a post flight image
debriefing. Suggested solutions:
o

Left/right arrows when an image is being viewed that goes to next image

o

Slideshow functionality for automatically stepping between images
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9.4. SSR/RMM hardware development
9.4.1.Indications of operational status
9.4.1.1. BIT performance: Make SSR changes that provide a robust BIT
functionality to allow aircrew to quickly and accurately determine a SSR
degrade status.
9.4.1.2. Record status: Make CVRS changes that allow aircrew to quickly and
accurately determine which display surfaces are being recorded and how
much record time is left. Suggested solution:
o

Make CVRS control panel changes to incorporate a time remaining
counter and real time indications that the selected displays are
recording.

9.4.1.3. Allow command of maximum record capacity in the aircraft: Make
SSR interface changes to allow aircrew to manually command the
availability of full record capacity while in the aircraft. Suggested solution:
o

Make MC changes to provide a “Format” pushbutton that when
pushed commands the SSR to provide full record capacity for the
RMM regardless of pre-existing video.

9.4.2.Useable Erase: Make Erase changes to allow aircrew to quickly and reliably
erase all classified data on the RMM. Suggested solutions:
o

Make SSR changes to speed the erase functions

o

Make RMM hardware changes to provide “Flash” memory with self
destruct capability

9.4.3.Playback video in the cockpit: Make SSR interface changes to allow aircrew
to view SSR video in flight. Suggested solution:
o

SSR hardware changes to connect the fourth video channel to the cockpit
displays.

o

MC changes to provide VCR functionality to include selection of any
recorded display, selection of PLAY/FFWD/REW/PAUSE/STOP/FRAME
FWD/FRAM REW functions, and UFCD entry of the desired time for video
playback.
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9.5. Mission computer software development
9.5.1.VIEW cues when a new image is available: Provide path for aircrew to view
the most recently received image from the Image T/R page. Suggested
solution:
o

Implement a VIEW NEW pushbutton on the Image T/R format that appears
when a new image has been accepted and remains until the new image
has been viewed.

9.5.2.Increased image manipulation/view options: Provide aircrew with improved
option in the cockpit for viewing received and captured images. Suggested
solutions:
o

Implement haloing of image annotations to allow cockpit annotations to be
viewed on light images

o

Implement zoom function that allows aircrew to view images at higher
resolution

o

Implement image rotation functions that allow 2-D rotation of the image to
orient the image to the intended run in heading. Also provide an automatic
mode that orients the image to the current aircraft to target heading.

9.5.3.Reduced options for image type: Provide aircrew with simplified image type
options. Suggested solution:
o

Eliminate EagleEye compression, all images in JPEG format

o Change current FAST/MED/SLOW mechanization to FAST/SLOW with
FAST using current MED compression setting and SLOW using current
SLOW compression settings.
9.6. Datalink development
9.6.1.VMF image recipients: Allow other VMF recipients to get the image even with
one non-image capable member. Suggested solution:
o

Make VMF imagery message consistent with other VMF messages by
sending image packets to those nodes who ack back.
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9.6.2.Image net number improvements: Provide aircrew the ability to mission plan
own image net number and view other Link-16 participants image net number.
Suggested solutions:
o

Provide JMPS interface to set image net number during mission planning

o

Change PPLI architecture to include image net number

9.7. Development of parallel systems for other image platforms: Provide datalink
capability for other platforms that are potential tactical imagery platforms/customers.
Suggested solutions:
o

Ground station suitable for deployment with troops on foot

o

Ground station suitable for deployment to command centers

o

Ship station suitable for deployment on aircraft carriers

o

Airborne capability for command and control aircraft

o

Airborne capability for UAVs
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